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Abstract: 
 
State-structures in Somalia is addressing the problem of what a state-structure is, what it 
should do and how and why they are being created. The Internal demand for structures 
among ordinaries Somalia to provide them security, often conflict with the security 
interests that the international society and external actors have in forming a state 
structure to promote their own security needs. How successful/unsuccessful state-
structure are formed, their performance and ability to survive is the focus of this thesis. 
This thesis concludes that in order to be successful, a state-structure has to be formed 
bottom-up though the demand of the local people, and build on accepted local 
governance norms. A state-structure imposed top-down by external actors or the 
international society will always fail in Somalia due to lack of local legitimacy and 
support. 
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“Ceel Na Uma Qodna, Cidina Uma 
magna” 
 
 (“The well is neglected and empty, 
 and there is no one working on our behalf.”) 
- Somali proverb1
                                                 
1
 Lewis and Mayall, ―A Study of Decentralised Political Structure for Somalia,‖ ii. 
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Maps of Somalia 
Map 1: The Sovereign state of Somalia, with the area inhabited by Ethnic Somali‘s outlined. Map from : 
http://rpmedia.ask.com/ts?u=/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/26/Somali_map.jpg/200px-Somali_map.jpg 27.feb.2011 
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Map 2: The ‗political‘  situation in Somalia 23.Feb.2011, Map from : 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Somalia_map_states_regions_districts.png 27.Feb.2011 
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State-Structures in Somalia 
Why do some Succeed and Others fail? 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Why Somalia is an Issue. 
Despite being an economically unimportant, defunct and war-ravaged state, Somalia is a problem for 
the states in the International Society (IS). Why are these states and the international media so 
concerned/interested with the problems of this poor country which hides in the Horn of Africa?    
The reason is not because of the massive humanitarian suffering in Somalia. That agenda died with the 
‗Black Hawk Down‘ incident in 1993 and the consequent withdrawal of the United Nations (UN) 
forces. The reason the states of the world, and the mass media today, is pre-occupied with Somalia is 
because of the problems Somalia is causing for the IS. Somalia is, in the eyes of the IS and the world, a 
failed state. No recognised government is actively controlling its territory which means that pirates and 
‗terrorists‘ can operate out of Somalia‘s ‗ungoverned‘ territory, and this poses a threat to the IS as no 
government can be held accountable. This is because the IS is a social system where states are 
supposed to be accountable to other states of the IS for all activities originating from their territory. In 
this social system Somalia is clearly failing to do that job. 
  
Interestingly, there are other state-structures located in the territory of the official sovereign state of 
Somalia who are controlling territory and doing what the ‗official‘ state should have done. Such state-
structures are providing governance and security, first and foremost to their population, but are also 
creating order, and ensuring that illegal activities (as seen by the IS) are not present or operating out of 
their territory. In short, these kind of state-structures are doing precisely what the IS wants from a state. 
In spite of this, the other states in the IS still refuse to recognise these state-structures as states, despite 
the obvious fact that some of these de facto state-structures are providing high quality governance. 
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Instead the states of the IS continue to insist that this power and duty belongs to the ‗sovereign‘ 
government of Somalia and nobody else. Therefore the IS are desperately trying to revive and support 
this totally dysfunctional government of Somalia, that does none of the things the IS wants from it, 
while at the same time refusing to support or even recognise the state-structure that is providing these 
services.  
 
This paper will investigate why some state-structures succeed and others fail in Somalia. What are the 
different interests as seen from the local population and the IS in creating/maintaining/destroying these 
structures, and how do these two different interests and norms behind state-structure formation affect 
each other and come into conflict? Are the IS norms of state-structures compatible with the local 
Somali people
2
, and if not what should be done to overcome this problem to allow functioning state-
structures to be created to the benefit of both the local population and the IS? 
 
This paper will argue that the primary interest in state-structures seen from the local vs. the IS 
perspective is different. Both parties want security, but first and foremost for themselves. This causes 
two approaches to state-structure formation- top-down and bottom-up. This paper will argue that top-
down IS sponsored state-structures have not been and can never be successful in Somalia due to 
traditional Somali political/governance traditions. Bottom-up locally formed state-structures can be 
successful if they can develop without interference from the IS. If such a structure is allowed to 
establish itself, it will benefit both the local population and the IS interest in security. 
 
 
1.2 Overview 
This paper will begin by outlining the idea about what a state is and what is it supposed to do, as seen 
from the IS and the locals perspectives respectively. The tools for analysing the various state-structures 
and their performance will be presented and thereafter used to analyse the situation in Somalia. Somalia 
                                                 
2
 This paper is using the name Somali to refer to the ethnic group, when for example talking about ‗Somali‘ culture and 
governance-tradition. The word Somalian is referring to a person living in the territory of the official sovereign state of 
Somalia. 
10 
 
will be presented into this framework by introducing Somali culture and governance traditions in order 
to understand how these norms work in relation to the norms of the IS. The Somali political culture and 
governance-culture is de-centralised, unlike western (and IS) political structure which emphasises a 
hierarchical structure with an ‗all power sovereign‘ at the top of the structure. This is important in order 
to understand the clash of the Somali governance norms and the IS notions of governance and 
sovereign states. Through this analytical framework, this paper will present two different approaches 
and examples of state-structure creation; the successful locally constructed bottom-up de facto state of 
Somaliland and the failed IS-created quasi state-structure called the TFG (Transitional Federal 
Government). Somaliland will be analysed and used as a case of a successful locally formed bottom-up 
functioning state-structure that was successful because it was built on, and with, this traditional 
Somalia political governance-structure. Why and how it was possible for Somaliland to achieve this 
will be analysed. The capabilities and performance of the IS top-down created state-structure for 
Somalia, the TFG will be outlined along with the interests of the IS in trying to create such a state-
structure. The TFG performance will be used to analyse the results of trying to impose a state-structure 
on Somalia in a top-down process. This approach however failed as it was not in line with the 
legitimate governance-traditions of Somali culture. Using the two examples of Somaliland of the TFG, 
this paper will analyse why a third state-structure, the bottom-up ‗Union of Islamic Courts‘ (UIC) from 
2006, failed in the south. The analysis will investigate the interplay between IS state norms (and 
interests) vs. local societal norms (and interests) in state-structure formation, as the state-structure did 
not fail due to a lack of local legitimacy but due to external actors interests. This will be done to 
analyse the two different perceptions of what the primary responsibility and duties of a state is. These 
three cases will then be analysed against each other in order to conclude why some state-structures fail 
and others succeed, and especially what role the norms of the IS, and the interests of the actors in it 
play in. This conclusion will be used to make recommendation of how the problems of Somalia should 
be handled to achieve ‗success‘‘ in Somalia. 
 
This paper will show the discrepancy between local and International (external) interests in what a state 
is and what it should do. Somalia has been a collapsed state since 1991. People living in a collapsed 
state want to build a state that can serve their interests by delivering state services. The International 
Society (IS) want a state too so it can serve their own interests. Due to the insecurity in north-east 
Somalia after the civil-war, the people of northern Somalia constructed a state on their own – 
11 
 
Somaliland, to provide governance - primarily security. The IS also want security, but primarily for the 
other states in the IS, not first and foremost for the local Somalians. The IS has therefore (14 times 
since 2000) tried to create a sovereign government of Somalia (the TFG) to serve its needs. While the 
common interests in security should make the two sides‘ priorities complementary, the discrepancies 
between the two sides norms and interests makes them come into conflict. 
 
 This paper will argue that Somaliland succeeded because it was constructed using local conflict-
handling mechanisms, uses traditional societal norms and governance structures, and that it was out of 
the focus of the IS long enough to allow this time-consuming traditional governance process to work. 
The IS attempted top-down state-structure (the TFG) has failed because it has no legitimacy among the 
Somalians, and it is only serving the interests of the IS. The UIC was like Somaliland, based on local 
indigenous governance structures, but failed because the actors of the IS had other vested interests in 
Somalia that were not complementary with the UIC.  Therefore it chose to kill the emerging state-
structure in the construction process while it was very vulnerable.  
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2. Unsettling the Sovereign State: Positive 
Sovereignty, Negative Sovereignty and the de Facto State 
 
What is a state and what is a state-structure? This chapter will present the analytical tools this paper 
will use for analysing the state-structures in Somalia. Important theoretical tools are also the norms of 
states in the International Society (IS), pitted against the norms and needs ordinary people have for a 
state-structure. In short, what is a state, and to whom is it accountable? In order to analyse the 
capability of various state-structures and who they are accountable to, analytical tools such as positive 
and negative sovereignty, de facto states and quasi-states, will also be defined and explained. 
 
This essay will use Somaliland as a blueprint on how to construct a bottom-up, de facto state (-
structure), serving the need of ordinary people for governance. The example of Somaliland will be used 
to analyse the situation in south-central Somalia, where several top-down attempts of state-construction 
facilitated by the IS have failed, along with bottom-up approaches in the same area.
3
 The relations 
between these various norms for state-structures and diverging interest in state-structure construction 
are a key focus of this paper. 
 
2.1 The State 
The definition of what constitutes a state is not universally agreed upon but the basic definition this 
paper will use in this paper is that of Max Weber
4
. His definition of a state is that it is a political 
                                                 
3
 There is another moderately successful bottom up-state structure in north-eastern Somalia called Puntland from 1998. I 
have deliberately left Puntland out of this paper due to the lack of space allowing a deeper investigation. The case of 
Puntland is not distracting for the narrative of this paper and the points outlined about state-structure formation. Puntland 
initially used local traditional governance capacity like Somaliland, but was unsuccessful in establishing a well-functioning 
structure as fighting broke out about the leadership positions in the ‗government‘. Puntland does not claim independence 
like Somaliland does, and its ‗leaders‘ are somewhat cooperating with the TFG. Puntland have not been effective in 
monopolising the use of violence. Therefore piracy is common and security, representation and welfare is not comparable to 
Somaliland.. For the Puntland story, see: Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, 100. And: Hoehne, ―Mimesis and 
Mimicry,‖ 252. 
4
 Hameiri, ―Capacity and its fallacies,‖ 59. 
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organisation or community that holds and controls a territory, by having the legitimate monopoly over 
the use of violence: To quote Weber‘s own definition: 
 
―… [A] human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical forces within a given territory.‖5 
 
Weber‘s definition of a state is interesting and can be ambiguous, as the word legitimate can be (and is) 
interpreted in two different ways. What is the legitimate use of violence? Is it the right to exercise 
violence? Or is it the capability to exercise violence? Regarding the right to exercise violence, a further 
question arises - who judges who has that right? 
 
2.2 Sovereignty 
In international politics, the key word in regard to the state is sovereignty. Sovereignty originally 
means something akin to supremacy, indicating the Supreme (exclusive) monopoly of violence. 
Jackson introduces a useful definition between the two kinds of sovereignty (actual and legal) in his 
book, Quasi-States, in order to distinguish between negative sovereignty (legal sovereignty) and 
positive sovereignty (actual sovereignty).
6
 
 
A third question that arises is what a state is supposed to do with this monopoly of violence. From the 
perspective of other states in the IS, a state should use this monopoly to honour its commitment to other 
states in the IS.
7
 From the perspective of the citizens of a state, the role that the monopoly of violence 
(the ‗state‘) should fulfil is to deliver security, representation and welfare to its citizens. This definition 
of the state‘s duties towards its citizens is outlined by Milliken and Kruse:  
 
―[T]he very least a state should protect its citizens; from harm and provide order; represent the 
symbolic identity of its citizens; and assist in the development of wealth.‖8 
 
                                                 
5
 Hameiri, ―Failed states or a failed paradigm?,‖ 136. Emphasis and brackets original. 
6
 Jackson, Quasi-states, 27. 
7
 Ibid., 28. 
8
 Hameiri, ―Failed states or a failed paradigm?,‖ 135. 
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2.2.1 Negative Sovereignty, Social Recognition 
 In the modern notion of statehood this recognised ‗sovereign‘ right to exercise violence has assumed a 
legal standard, belonging only to Sovereign States.
9
 The sovereign state decides whether or not they 
want to ‗recognise‘ other states. This recognition is then codified by membership of the states‘ ‗Club‘ - 
the United Nations (UN). Social acceptance as a state in the International Society (IS) of states means 
that the government is recognised as the sole legal holder of legitimate violence (power) in a defined 
territory. Membership in the IS ‗Social Club‘ means that the state is being socialised to act according to 
a set of norms, laws, rights and duties of states. Jackson defines this social-normative right to the 
monopoly of violence (granted by the IS) as negative-sovereignty. Fundamentally this is a recognised 
right to the monopoly of violence (but does not necessarily mean that the government holds the ‗actual‘ 
monopoly of violence). 
 
Recognised negative sovereignty officially gives the state ‗freedom from outside interference‘ and 
recognition as legally representing the state internationally.
10
 This mutual recognition between states is 
the basic socialisation procedure of the IS. With this negative right to legal sovereignty (statehood) 
recognised, a state with negative sovereignty can make binding social contracts with other states.
11
 All 
international relations are premised on the social expectation that these agreements will be kept.  This 
unitary view of what a state is and what it is supposed to do is codified in The Montevideo Convention 
on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933. The characteristics of a state are here defined as: (A) a 
permanent population; (B) a defined territory; (C) a government; and (D) the capacity to enter into 
relations with the other states.
12
  
 
2.2.2 Positive Sovereignty, Actual Power 
Positive sovereignty presupposes that a state have capabilities to actively rule in their territory.
13
 
Positive sovereignty is the true Webern definition of a state, as it entails the actual monopoly over the 
use of violence, and therefore the actual monopoly of power. Positive sovereignty is thus the process of 
                                                 
9
 James, Sovereign Statehood, XXI. 
10
 Jackson, Quasi-states, 27. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Kaplan, ―The remarkable story of Somaliland,‖ 153. 
13
 Jackson, Quasi-states, 29. 
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the state actively providing services, such as security welfare and representation to the citizens in its 
territory. If that state is actively providing services to its citizens and at the same time is recognised 
through negative sovereignty, the state is in total exercising effective sovereignty.
14
 If it is providing 
positive sovereignty but is not recognised, it is called a de facto state. Positive sovereignty is closely in 
line with Weber‘s definition: ―Max Weber and his followers, focuses on the quality of state control and 
its coherence.‖15 A state-structure can therefore display strong positive sovereignty without being a 
‗state‘ in the eyes of the IS. 
 
2.2.3 The Discrepancy between Positive and Negative Sovereignty 
This obvious discrepancy between (some) states positive and negative sovereignty can, according to 
Robert Jackson, be traced to the decolonisation process. In the colonial times, a state had to show and 
prove its survivability through economic, military and governance merit; that it had the ‗right to live‘.16 
This meant that strong positive sovereignty was a pre-condition for negative sovereignty and statehood, 
as a state that could not control its own territory and protect itself against other states would die and 
become a colony or part of the territory of a state that could.
17
 The decolonisation process (and the 
UN), gave the former colonies full sovereign-state rights upon independence, despite the fact that 
several of them did not have the capability to effectively self-govern through sufficient positive 
sovereignty.
18
 Robert Jackson has put it this way: 
 
―[O]nce sovereignty is acquired by virtue of independence from colonial rule, then extensive 
civil strife or breakdown of order and governmental immobility or any other failures are not 
considered to detract from it‖19 
 
In short some former colonies had not earned their independence through political capability and 
resources, but instead had it granted for ‗free‘ due to the ‗new‘ norms of the UN-era IS.  
 
                                                 
14
 Clunan, Trinkunas, and Harold, Ungoverned Spaces, 17. 
15
 Hameiri, ―Capacity and its fallacies,‖ 59. 
16
 Pegg, De Facto States in the International System, 5. 
17
 Pegg, ―De Facto States in the International System,‖ 1. a truly sovereign state 
18
 Pegg, ―De Facto States in the International System,‖ 1. 
19
 Ibid. 
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Consequently, several newly independent states, recognised as having full sovereign-state rights by the 
UN and the IS in their defined territory, were actually not controlling that territory. The recognition of 
negative sovereign rights is however (almost) absolute, implying that a state with a fully collapsed 
state-apparatus, will still be supported and held up through international efforts.
20
 The territory of 
already recognised sovereign states is considered ‗sacred‘ and cannot be changed as statehood is 
guaranteed through UN recognition and practice. This, in practice, means that a state does not 
necessarily require a government to have the rights of a recognised sovereign state.
21
 An example of 
this UN practice can be seen by the UN‘s handling of the state collapse in Somalia in 1991. After the 
collapse, the UN general secretary sent a letter to the UN Security Council (UNSC) in November 1992 
to discuss the problems that: ―[O]ne of its member states, Somalia, suffered from the total absence of a 
government‖22 The UNSC however decided to treat Somalia as if were still a sovereign state, and kept 
referring to its: ―[S]overeignty, territorial integrity, [and the] political independence and unity of 
Somalia‖23 In short, the state collapse was in a legal sense simply ignored. Total state collapse therefore 
does not affect statehood, as it is protected by (negative) sovereignty. Weber‘s definition of a state, as 
possessing an (actual) monopoly over violence in a territory, is therefore today not a de facto 
requirement in order to be recognised as the legitimate rulers of a state. Even with total state failure the 
quasi-state‘s government retains the right to speak on behalf of its citizens and represent the state  
internationally.
 24
  
 
2.2.4 Quasi-States become Failed States 
A sovereign state with weak positive sovereignty (little actual control) is labelled by Robert Jackson as 
a quasi-state.
25
 The states of the IS have never liked these out of a fear that already concluded inter-
states agreements will not be kept because of a state‘s lack of control over its territory. After the Cold 
War and especially since 9/11, quasi-states have been renamed failed states
26
. The renaming is based 
on the fear that the state cannot control its territory and that terrorists and instability therefore can grow 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., 2. 
21
 Koskenmaki, ―Legal implications,‖ 34. 
22
 Ibid., 6. Un doc. S/24868 
23
 Ibid., 15. 
24
 Ibid., 34. 
25
 Jackson, Quasi-states, 21. 
26
 This thesis will not go into a deeper discussion about the use of the term failed states, as it is not the focus of this thesis.  
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out of these ‗ungoverned areas‘ and pose a security threat to other states of the IS.27 To prevent this 
other states of the IS will assist other sovereign states to help them control their ‗rightful‘ territory. 
 
2.2.5 International „Development‟ Aid 
The strong UN and IS backing for states with (already recognised) negative sovereign rights, have 
meant that considerable resources and powerful organisations and states are willing to help quasi/failed 
sovereign states to build governance capability to actually govern their territory.
28
 This state-building 
effort is a main interest of the IS, in order to establish a unitary state actor capable of entering into 
relations with other states in the IS and to honour their promises through effective control over their 
territory. The responsibility of sovereign states towards each other in the IS promotes order, stability 
and security for states in the IS. Other states are therefore willing to pay for, and assist sovereign states 
with weak positive sovereignty in developing institutions and capabilities to help them in that task.  
 
2.2.6 De Facto States and Bottom-Up State-Structure 
The strong international focus on the rights of sovereign states have meant that states, and especially 
the UN, often fail to see the potential in alternative state structures, even though some of them are 
fulfilling Weber‘s definition of a state‘s duties from a positive sovereignty viewpoint. The most 
significant of these is the de facto state. De facto states are state structures that display full positive 
sovereignty, but are unrecognised by the UN and therefore have no negative sovereignty. As such they 
are not ‗socially‘ acceptable to the IS.  
 
―A de facto state exists where there is an organized political leadership which has risen to 
power through some degree of indigenous capability; receives popular support; and has 
achieved sufficient capability to provide governmental services to a given population in a 
defined territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for an extended period of 
time. The de facto state views itself as capable of entering into relations with other states and it 
seeks full constitutional independence and widespread international recognition. It is, however, 
unable to achieve any degree of substantive recognition and therefore remain[s] illegitimate in 
the eyes of international society‖29  
                                                 
27
 Bilgin and Morton, ―From ‗Rogue‘to ‗Failed‘States?,‖ 171. 
28
 Jackson, Quasi-states, 112. 
29
 Pegg, De Facto States in the International System, 26.-32, Emphasis original, Pegg defines  the time period as two years. 
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De facto states are usually bottom-up structures, providing state services to the local population as the 
result of indigenous pressure and capacity-building. These bottom-up state-structures provide first and 
foremost order and security, but also representation, and welfare for its ‗citizens‘.30 
 
The de facto state is therefore a fully functioning state-structure, in that it fulfils Weber‘s definition of a 
state. It exhibits all the required positive-sovereignty criteria for (effective-sovereignty) statehood, but 
lacks recognition from other states and therefore has no negative-sovereignty. Typically a de facto state 
controls a part of the territory of an existing sovereign state. On the basis of this territory it claims and 
strives for recognition by other states as the legitimate ruler of this territory.
31
 The de facto state is not 
considered legitimate and therefore cannot participate in international institutions. Nor is it considered 
to be an equal partner in the IS.  Pegg uses this very astute quote to highlight this discrepancy, defining 
them as the ‗inverse of the quasi-state‘: 
 
―The quasi-state is legitimate no matter how ineffective it is. Conversely, the de facto state is 
illegitimate no matter how effective it is‖32 
 
 
2.3 Top-down, International State-building 
As discussed above, states in the IS have an interest in maintaining the social order in the system of 
states – the International Society (IS). Therefore all states must follow the norms, and one of the norms 
of the Montevideo Convention is that states can make binding agreements with other states. The IS are 
therefore interested in ensuring that recognised states have sufficient positive sovereignty to actively 
enforce binding inter-state agreements, in accordance with the Montevideo Convention.  
 
The IS interests in helping a state to actively control their territory has become even more important 
post- 9/11. After 9/11, the IS considers failed states to be a direct security threat as ‗ungoverned‘ 
                                                 
30
 Hameiri, ―Failed states or a failed paradigm?,‖ 135. 
31
 The state that is officially recognised as the holder of negative-sovereign rights of this territory is naturally not happy with 
this. 
32
 Pegg, ―De Facto States in the International System,‖ 1. 
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territories are perceived to be dangerous as they can potentially become safe havens for non-state actors 
such as Al-Qaeda or other terrorists.
33
  
 
This concern for a state‘s positive sovereignty capability and a focus on what is seen as ‗acceptable‘ 
state-forms, have in reality ‗securitised‘ the existence of the sovereign state.  The official United States 
(US) national security strategy from 2002 states that: ―America is now threatened less by conquering 
states than we are by failing ones‖.34 Because of this, securitisation of statehood, ‗Good Governance‘ 
and the state‘s level of territorial control, is now considered a direct security interest by the US and 
IS.
35
 This has influenced the ‗acceptable‘ forms of state structures that are allowed to arise based on 
local initiative, due to the fear of terrorist safe havens.
36
 Since 9/11 the interest in state performance has 
not been out of genuine interest (especially for the people living in the states), but, due to other states in 
the IS, self-interested security concerns.
37
 This priority means that many states‘ policies towards weak 
states become multi-pronged, with aid, development and security policy ‗integrated‘ into a combined 
solution to handle what is perceived as a direct ‗national security‘ problem.38 
 
2.3.1 Solution: One-Size-Fits-All Capacity Building 
The international system of states and the UN assist (failed/weak) sovereign states to help them 
improve their positive sovereignty. The solution to the problem is seen as assisting state rebuilding or 
strengthening their institutional governance capacity. This is perceived as the best way to ensure that 
states can be strengthened to handle their responsibilities (first and foremost towards the IS). The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) official working committee on the 
issue, ‗The fragile states groups‘ published its ‗Principles for good international engagement in fragile 
states‘ in 2005, stating: ―States are fragile when governments and state structures lack capacity‖39. The 
                                                 
33
 Clunan, Trinkunas, and Harold, Ungoverned Spaces, 21. 
34
 http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss1.html 1.feb.2011 
35
 Clunan, Trinkunas, and Harold, Ungoverned Spaces, 21. 
36
 Hameiri, ―Capacity and its fallacies,‖ 73. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Bradbury and Kleinman, Winning Hearts and Minds?, 14. 
39
 Kaplan, Fixing fragile states, 6. 
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solution to the problem of weak states is therefore generally handled as a one-size-fits-all solution of 
building institutional capacity to assist existing (recognised) state-structures.
40
 
 
2.3.2 Neo-Liberalism as the International Norm 
This capacity-building is framed in a neo-liberal
41
 (and liberal peace) context, as economic 
development is seen as the best way to enhance the strength and coherence of weak states.
42
 Security 
and economic interest is perceived as interconnected, and neo-liberal market-oriented institutions are 
therefore a priority. From a neo-liberal perspective, the market is free, and the government should not 
actively participate in the economy as market forces should rule supreme. The market however needs a 
regulatory framework and justice enforcement to ensure property rights so that the market can operate 
‗freely‘. State institutions are seen as the governance structure to handle that issue, as creating a strong 
‗government‘ is seen as too intrusive. The focus has therefore been on building and strengthening 
‗apolitical‘ state institutions that can guarantee the free market, without interfering with or controlling 
economic development.
43
 These ‗apolitical‘ or ‗neutral‘ structures are meant to support a 
democratically-elected government whose job is to oversee these ‗apolitical‘ institutions.44  
 
2.3.4 State Norms: One-Size-Fits-All Cocktail 
The IS has been totally dominated by the idea of neo-liberal norms for statehood since the end of the 
Cold War, or as Roland Paris put it, the neo-liberal model is now ―the only model of government with 
any broad ideological legitimacy and appeal in the world‖.45 This combines with the fact that the 
Westphalian spatial norms have also obtained monopoly status. According to UN secretary Kofi Annan 
it is: ―the only imaginable spatial framework for political life‖.46 This normative use of the Westphalian 
spatial framework means that the existing territorial boundaries of existing recognised states is fixed. 
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Locally ‗arisen‘ de facto states, spatially located inside existing recognised Westphalia states, can 
therefore not be accepted. 
 
These norms combine to produce a powerful and difficult cocktail for acceptable state-structure. IS 
norms demand: a liberal democratic state, within the existing territorial boundaries of the existing 
sovereign state, built on the reformed institutions of the existing government/state.   
 
2.3.5 The One-Size-Fits-All Model Does Not fit Somalia, So What to do? 
The present literature and framework for neo-liberal state-building however has a problem with 
departing from a point of no government, as the leading liberal peace theorist Roland Paris points out: 
 
―Whereas classical liberal theorists recognized the vital role of effective state institutions 
as a necessary condition for domestic stability, this concern has largely disappeared 
from the contemporary liberal peace literature. Rather than starting from the hypothetical 
condition of nongovernment, contemporary students of the liberal peace have 
typically isolated specific characteristics of already constituted states and explored the 
relationship between these characteristics and the incidence of conflict‖47 
 
In the case of collapsed states (like Somalia), this brings about several problems. First of all, modern 
liberal state building literature has no idea of how to build capacity from scratch when no government 
exists to start building upon, as highlighted in the quote above. Somalia is a collapsed state, so there is 
no (functioning or official) domestic state institutions/government to reform or build upon. The IS have 
handled this problem by ad hoc creating the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), as the basis 
legitimate government for Somalia with recognised negative sovereignty, to attempt to build 
institutional-state-capacity on that, to serve the needs of the IS. 
 
2.3.6 Local Governance Structure-norms Scorned by the IS 
With only the  IS norms deemed acceptable for state-structure building, a local society‘s norms, culture 
and capacities are only viewed as relevant if they can assist in the strengthening of the capacity of these 
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(neo-liberal) state institutions.
48
 Indigenous/local capabilities or governance structures that deviate 
from the IS norms are seen as undesirable and disturbing elements in the process of strengthening neo-
liberal institutional capacity. This ‗norm of state governance‘ creates a divide between state and 
society, as the interest of the IS top-down neo-liberal institutional state-building is not primarily aimed 
at strengthening the political legitimacy of the actual government or governance-structure, but instead 
to build up the capability of the (neo-liberal) institutions available to that government. State coherence 
is judged by the strength of its institutions, not its anchoring in the local society and culture that it is 
governing.
49
  
 
An example of this can be seen in the state-building effort in the Solomon Islands from 2003. The 
‗Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands‘ (RAMSI), uses 75% of its 200 million (AUD) 
yearly budget for (neo-liberal) capacity-building, primarily in three areas; law and justice, machinery of 
government, and economic reform.
50
 RAMSI has caused considerable unrest in the Solomon Islands, 
primarily because its ‗institutional-capacity-building‘ is exercised parallel to the existing government 
and is overruling the local officials. RAMSI is run and controlled by international ‗advisors‘ which 
means that it is often disregarding and in some cases undermining existing functioning local anchored 
governance structures.
51
  
 
2.4 Critique of the IS Norms State-Building Methodology 
The tendency to divide state capacity and local societal anchoring and legitimacy has attracted strong 
criticism from academics recently, especially due to its lack of positive results.
52
 Seth Kaplan points 
out that the key for successful development is ‗social capital‘, defined as: ―[T]he norms and networks 
that enable people to act collectively.‖53 Local will is the best way to ensure successful states, and top-
down control undermines that: 
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―[A] successful state uses local identities, local capacities, and local institutions to promote its 
development, a dysfunctional country‘s state structures undermine all of these indigenous 
assets‖54. 
 
The local capabilities and special societal-governance norms are therefore slowly coming back into the 
focus of state-building literature, due to the limited results of the purely neo-liberal approach. 
 
2.5 States, Sovereignty and Somalia 
The theory in this chapter will be used to show that Somalia, since 1991, has fostered a clear-cut 
version of a quasi-state, and a clear cut de facto state, namely the TFG and Somaliland. The TFG fits 
the definition of a quasi-state because it has recognised negative sovereignty, but absolutely no 
positive-sovereignty. In short – it only exists on paper and is not of any practical to use the ordinary 
Somalians in Somalia. It does however receive support and assistance from the IS, and is therefore 
representing the interests and norms of the (state in the) IS. This fact is important; as the problems with 
Somalia as a ‗failed state‘ are built on the notions of IS-social norms. It is failed because it does not 
live up to its IS duties, not because it does not provide services such as security to its citizens. 
 
 Somaliland is a de facto state built in accordance (and with) with local governance-norms and 
capabilities. It is effectively providing government-services to its population through positive 
sovereignty. It is functioning as a state should in every way, but is not recognised and do therefore 
officially not exists as a IS social entity. Summed up it is built through the initiative of the citizens of 
the state-structure with the primary goal of serving their interest by providing them security, 
representation and welfare. On top of that it is also serving the security interest of the and has shown 
that it is possible to reconcile local and IS interest in a (locally constructed) bottom-up state-structure. 
 
These two clear-cut examples of a quasi-state and de facto-state will be used to analyse why a second 
emerging locally based bottom-up state-structure from 2006 (that could have become a de facto state) 
the UIC, failed shortly after it came to power.  
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The norms the IS are trying to promote in state-structure construction brings them into conflict with 
local governance capabilities and social Norms. The next chapter will outline and explain the 
importance of the history and (political) culture of Somalia, especially in relation to the clash between 
local Somali societal-structure and governance-norms, and their clash with western norms of sovereign 
statehood. 
25 
 
3. Background History of Somalia. 
 
3.1 Historical Background 
In order to understand Somalia, it is important to understand its historical background and other 
determinant factors. Of special interest is the difference between the traditional Somali governance 
structure and the challenges posed by Westphalian norms imposed by external actors since the colonial 
period and the fact that the colonial borders are still the official ones demarcating the state of Somalia. 
The local Somali and Westphalian societal structure conflict as traditional Somali society is an 
Acephalous Society – a Headless Society55, whereas Western norms have a clear heretical structure 
with a ‗head‘ in the form of an officially all-powerful person - the sovereign. Unlike Western societal 
organisational structures as defined by Hobbes and Weber, there is no sovereign or central control of 
the monopoly of violence in traditional Somali society/culture. Somali society is highly socially 
ordered, but in what has been called an ordered anarchy.
5657
 The Somali society is governance wise, a 
highly de-centralised governance structure and is therefore in direct conflict with the Westphalian 
sovereignty-centred International Society state norms. This divergence between local governance 
culture and the IS sovereign state-centric governance model is the cause of many problems in Somalia. 
 
Because of this societal structure in Somalia the traditional governance traditions and norms still 
influence the situation heavily. All state-building attempts in Somalia, from colonial to the national-
state (1960-1991) attempts and to the current day, have never succeeded in successfully transferring the 
political loyalty from the traditional clan ‗governance-system‘ to the state level. This is because the 
state has never fully been able to take over the governance services such as, security, representation and 
welfare, from the traditional providers of these services – the clan governance system. In short, in order 
to understand why state-structures fail or succeed one has to understand the Somali societal social 
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construct. Because of the negative experience Somalis have had with first a western style central state 
under colonial rule, then brutal dictatorship, and then state collapse and anarchy, one must bear in mind 
that the Somali people are rightfully suspicious of any centralised state-structure, unless it is 
compatible (and not-limiting or destructive to) their traditional well-working decentralised governance 
structure. 
 
This historical background chapter will first introduce the Somali ethnic group that gave Somalia its 
name. This will be followed by a chronological outline of Somali history. In the colonial era Somalia 
was separated into five colonial states during the imperial era, and only two of these colonies were 
merged to form the new Somali ‗nation-state‘ in 1960. Somalia‘s performance as a new independent 
state, the attempt by the dictator Barre to foster loyalty to his centralised state of Somalia, and the geo-
political influences that heavily affected Somalia in the period up to state collapse and failure in 1991, 
will be explained. After the state collapse, the IS intervened on humanitarian grounds, but failed, 
leaving Somalia to itself, and its local governance structures. After this historical overview the societal 
structure of the Somali people will be outlined and explained. Their political loyalties, governance form 
and traditions along with their identity law and security systems will also be explained. At the end of 
this chapter, the role of Islam will be outlined, as it is an integral part of Somali identity and 
governance structure. 
 
3.1.1 The Somalis 
The official territory of Somalia is of colonial legacy. Its name originates from the Somali people - an 
ethnic group that populates the Horn of Africa, totalling about 14 million people.
58
 The Somali people 
today inhabit all of Somalia, the Ogaden province of eastern Ethiopia, make up 60% of the population 
of Djibouti and are a significant minority in Kenya (se map 1, page 5) 
From a nation-building perspective, the Somali people should be a clear-cut case, as the characteristics 
of this ethnic group are homogenous. They all share the same ethnicity, culture, language and 
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religion.
59
 Seen from a European nation-state perspective, Somalia should therefore have a good basis 
for forming a successful nation-state, as minorities are not a significant problem.  
 
3.1.2 The Colonial Period 1880-1960, the Somalis Divided into Five 
States. 
In the colonial period, the Somali-populated region was carved up and divided between five colonial 
powers. The French controlled Djibouti, the British, Somaliland and Kenya, the Ethiopians with the 
Ogaden and the Italians with South-Central Somalia.
60
 Britain‘s interest in Somaliland was mainly 
strategic in order to protect its line of communications with India, as well as geo-strategic to counter 
French influence. The British never promoted immigration and ‗white‘ colonisation of Somaliland but 
ruled Somaliland with a fairly light hand. They had some trouble with control as their preferred method 
of indirect rule (tapping into the local structure and controlling it) did not initially work well in the 
decentralised Somali culture.
61
 The Italians established a fascist colony in southern Somalia and 
developed (banana) plantations and promoted the settlement of thousands of Italians to the colony. 
They established a centralised administration with Italians on the lead positions assisted by local 
Somali chiefs (Capos) and elders.
62
 The Italians were thus far more involved in building bureaucratic 
capacity to foster a Somali elite than the British. Ethiopia was one of the only African countries to 
avoid colonisation and fostered a working (strong, effective sovereignty) state structure on their own. 
Ethiopia rules the Ogaden province inhabited by ethnic Somalis.
 63
 Since Somalia‘s independence in 
1960 and the rise of Pan-Somali nationalism, the situation with Ethiopia has often been tense or at war, 
because of this ethnic Somali enclave. Ethiopia is the local ‗superpower‘, and continues to this day to 
have strong interests in the situation in Somalia.
64
 Colonial ambitions in East Africa flared up again in 
the 1930s, when fascist Italy briefly conquered Ethiopia in 1935 and British Somaliland in 1940.
65
 In 
1941, during World War II the Italians lost all of their acquired land and the British took over Italian 
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Somalia. In 1950 Italy returned to Italian Somalia and ruled the area as a UN trusteeship until 
independence in 1960.
66
 
 
3.1.3 Independence 1960 
The independence of the new Republic of Somalia in 1960 was part of the general de-colonisation 
process demanded by the UN.
67
 The international community wanted a sovereign ‗Westphalia‘ state, 
and that state was comprised of the former Italian and British colonies.
68
 In a structural view the 
situation was not perfect, as the ethnic Somalis living in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti would not be 
part of the new ‗nation‘-state.69 The flag of the new ‘Republic of Somalia‘, a five pointed star on a light 
blue background, represents these five divisions of the Somali people.
70
 This incomplete nation state-
building left ill feeling among many Somalis both in and outside the new state and this rise of pan-
Somali nationalism has cast long shadows and provoked conflict especially in their relations with 
Ethiopia. 
 
3.1.4 Italian Inspired Centralised State-Structure  
The new state of Somalia established a highly centralised nation-state based on a European Eurocentric 
view of a Westphalian state.
71
 Italian bureaucratic tradition was used as it held the strongest 
institutional capacity in the new state. The new state centralised power in southern Somalia and 
favoured this region at the expense of the North.
72
 The UN notion of self-determination and 
sovereignty for new states meant that Somali nationalism was flourishing and this pan-Somali struggle 
engendered conflict and some military confrontations between Kenya and Somalia, as Somalia 
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encouraged the Somali-inhabited provinces in Ethiopia (and Kenya) to revolt.
73
 This fed into the Cold 
War proxy-conflicts, with Ethiopia and Kenya becoming pro-Western, and Somalia pro-USSR.
74
 
 
3.1.5 Military Dictatorship - Barre’s Regime, 1969-1991 
General Mohammed Abshir Barre took over power in Somali in a coup d‘état in 1969.  Barre tried to 
nation-build through socialism and a development-program called ‗Scientific Socialism‘.75 Officially 
socialist, it was also to a large extent meant as a nation-building process, trying to foster loyalty to the 
state, and to abandon ‗backwards‘ traditions such as clan identity and other 'un-socialist' tendencies. 
Collectivisation and control over the economy was established also to reassure the USSR that they 
were truly a socialist ally and therefore worthy of continued Soviet support. Barre's security forces 
upheld brutal ‗justice‘ and suppressed all potential opposition to him.76 Barre was in general, however, 
fairly popular as he spoke to pan-Somalia nationalism. This nationalism led to the failed war with 
Ethiopia in 1977-78 over the Somali-inhabited Ogaden province of Ethiopia.
77
 
 
Somalia and Ethiopia switched Cold War allegiance in 1974 with Ethiopia becoming pro-USSR, and 
Somalia was forced to become more of a US proxy.
78
 Somalia‘s war with Ethiopia in 1977-78 was 
mainly a result of gaining control of the Somali-populated Ethiopian province of Ogaden but can also 
be seen as a Cold War move in which Barre failed to gain US support due to Jimmy Carter's dislike for 
Barre‘s brutal regime, and the fact that Somalia was the pro-forma aggressor.79 
 
3.1.6 Civil War and State Collapse 
The failed Ogaden war severely weakened Barre's regime as Barre (and Somalia) were seen to have 
been clearly defeated. The peace agreement with Ethiopia after the war weakened Barre's appeal as the 
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defender of the Pan-Somali Nation project. Opposition to Barre gained strength, and the regime 
responded by using increasingly brutal and draconian measures.
80
 Barre's regime increasingly went 
from having a somewhat national Somali appeal to becoming increasingly clannish as Barre 
increasingly based its power on his own and allied clans. Barre tried to reconsolidate his power in his 
own and allied clans, consolidating all power in the Marrehan, Ogaadeen and Dulbahante clans or ‗ 
MOD‘ rule.81 All other clan leaders were systematically suppressed or eliminated. This lead to the full 
scale rebellion of several of the other clans and they formed several regional/clan-based rebel 
movements to rid themselves of Barre's regime
82
. This resulted in a full scale civil war from 1988-
1991
83
. Among them was the Somali National Movement (SNM) in Northern Somalia which, in 1991 
declared the territory comprising of the former British Somaliland, independent. 
 
 
3.1.7 Humanitarian Intervention 1992-1995 
The civil war from 1988 was first ‗discovered‘ by the international media in 1992.84 The end of the 
Cold War and the ‗freeing‘ of the political agenda meant a much stronger focus on humanitarian issues. 
Therefore the chaos and 350,000 causalities in 1992 from civil war, inter-clan fighting and famine, 
became a media focus.
85
 The UN mission ‗restore hope‘ or ‗United Nations Operation in Somalia‘ 
(UNOSOM) however turned out to be disastrous as the UN (mainly the US) did not understand the 
local clan-structure and further aggravated the conflict instead of alleviating it.
86
 This is partly because 
they treated the warlords as legitimate actors, made deals with some and fought others. This lead to The 
famous ‗Black Hawk Down‘ incident in 1993 which led to the end of the ‗humanitarian intervention‘ in 
Somalia. 
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3.1.7.1 Collapsed State  
Since 1991, Somalia has not had a uniting effective government. The de facto state of Somaliland 
remains de facto independent, while the rest of Somalia has experienced various levels of anarchy. 
Since 2000 The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) government has officially held the sovereignty 
over Somalia.
87
 In the absence of any functioning government to provide services, the people of 
Somalia have relied on their traditional governance structures to survive. 
 
 
3.2 Societal Structure and Traditional 
Governance 
To understand the basis of state structures in Somalia, societal norms, traditional loyalties and social 
organization, is important in order to understand the basic construct of Somali political culture.  
Political identity as part of a political community can change over time but in Somali culture the basic 
loyalty is traditionally the kinship/Clan system because it has been the most stable provider of 
governance services - first and foremost security. In a functioning state a large portion of security, 
representation and welfare services is provided or facilitated by the state, but if a state fails, political 
loyalty is transferred to a lower hierarchy level, that can actually provide social services and security. 
This is the situation in Somalia because as Ken Menkhaus has noted the state failure in 1991 did not 
produce anarchy but instead ‗an extreme degree of decentralisation‘.88 
 
3.2.1 Political Loyalty lies with the Clan 
Somalia was a clan society before it became colonised (by Western norms). Despite the homogenous 
characteristics of the Somali population/ethnic group, and the somewhat strong ‗national‘ Somali 
identity, especially after independence, political loyalty remains bound to the clan, because the clan has 
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been the most reliable provider of governance services. A Somali is loyal to his clan before he is loyal 
to his ‗nation‘. 89 
   
During the Republic of Somalia (1960-1991), ‗nation-building‘ was pursued through nationalism and 
socialism (under Barre). These nation-building projects that have worked so well in several Western 
states have however not worked well in many post-independent African states. The government of   
Somalia tried to foster loyalty to the nation and disband the clan system, but never succeeded in doing 
so, as the state could not fully take over the governance services that the clan had previously provided. 
After the state collapsed, the political loyalty was totally devolved back to the clans, and Somalia today 
remains a clan society. The normative governance structure of this clan society is therefore important to 
understand in order to analyse why some state structures succeed and others fail in Somalia.  
 
3.2.2 Clan Rule – Desert Democracy 
Somali social structure is highly de-centralised or may even be described as un-centralised. The 
traditional societal structure, unlike the European notion of a state, does not have any permanent bodies 
or even permanent leaders. It is a tribal democracy where elders gather on an ad hoc basis and decide 
by consensus.
90
 The decision process is highly democratic but not electoral as (male) elders represent 
related families or alliances of families or clans. The alliances of these lineage-groups, clans or sub-
clans are always shifting and very dynamic, depending on interests and shifting allegiances.  
Representation is therefore based on kinship family-loyalty relations. 
 
3.2.2.1 Identity Structure 
The societal and identity structure in the Somali society is decided by four levels of identification and 
loyalty. 1) Clan family 2) Clan/sub-clan 3) Dia Paying Group 4) Lineage kinsmen.
91
 The Somali ethnic 
group is split into six clan-families: Dir, Darod, Iraq, Hawiye, Digil and Rahanweyn. All the clans live 
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in a roughly assigned territory area of Somalia.
92
 The Clan family is the highest potential unit of 
political loyalty in traditional Somali society
93
, but that does not mean that the primary loyalty lies 
there, as a major part of clan-fighting and feuds take place between clans of the same clan-family.
94
  
 
The six clan families are sub-split into 
roughly 100 (main) clans
95
, who are 
again often split into sub-clans. The 
size of the clans varies from a few 
thousand people to over 100,000 
people, with smaller clans generally 
showing more unity. A clan or sub-
clan is a grouping of several related 
‗Dia Paying Groups‘ comprised of 
immediate-related family groups 
(lineage kinsmen).
96
 The Dia Paying 
Groups is the basic unit of security 
and enforcement of justice in the 
traditional Somali society. It is a 
group of several immediate related 
(nuclear) families, united through 
genealogy (lineage kinsmen).
97
  The 
Dia Paying Group, pay and receive 
compensation for injuries or deaths 
and injury (blood Money), when in 
conflict with other Dia Paying 
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Groups.
98
 In Hobbesian terms, the Dia Paying Group is therefore the basic social contract, providing 
collective protection and security. Justice in traditional Somali culture is not exercised by punishment, 
but by demanding or paying compensation, to mitigate justice. If a clan member (unjustly) kills another 
man or woman, his Dia Paying Group collectively has to pay the deceased person's Dia Paying Group, 
money (or more rightly camels) to mitigate the injustice.
99
 The Dia Paying Group therefore bears the 
burden of a crime committed by one of its members. This collective responsibility is therefore an 
important social control factor that is discouraging violence and promoting social order and good 
behaviour.
100
 All units of the traditional society are however very dynamic and without permanent 
governing bodies. They are ad hoc governance structures, and therefore live up to the term ‗governance 
without government‘ as there are not permanent governing bodies. The Somali expert Lewis defines 
the ad hoc bodies of Somali society as: ―[O]ppositional units that can be mobilized in contested 
situations‖101  
 
3.2.2.2 Somali Customary Law (Xeer) 
Somali Customary Law (Xeer) defines basic social norms and values and is a code for regulating and 
guiding political relations and behaviour along group or clan lines.
102
 It is based on unwritten contracts 
or agreements between clans. Without sovereign or permanent bodies to enforce the laws of the Xeer, 
the law is upheld and interpreted at meetings of clan elders who gather only if there are matters to be 
resolved or disputes to be mitigated to reach a consensual agreement in Shir meetings.
103
 Elders can be 
any adult male, speaking on behalf of a kinship group or clan. There are no votes and agreement is 
reached through consensus. All elders (who represent their clan, Dia paying group or family) are 
allowed to participate. The Somali Xeer contains advanced mechanisms for resolving disputes and 
conflicts. Of special interest is the notion of a Gurti conference, a special conference/gathering of 
elders from the clans, who are held only when conflicts need to be handled.
104
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3.2.2.3 Governance without Government 
Somali society has often been described as ordered-anarchy where political order is maintained 
through family allegiance (kinship system) operating through a collective institution and through 
reciprocal rule based behaviour defined in Somali Customary Law (Xeer).
105
 The Social Contract, that 
in the Western tradition is a (centralised) contract between subjects and sovereign (Hobbes) is, in the 
Somali culture, a social contract without a sovereign.
106
 It can rightly be called ‗security by deterrence‘ 
as the enforcement is through negotiation between the Dia Paying Groups who are obligated to take 
revenge for a crime committed against a member of the group if blood money/camels (Dia) is not 
paid.
107
 
 
3.2.2.4 Militias and Warlords 
The clans often field their own militia to ensure protection. Somalian society is therefore (traditionally) 
a mosaic of clans in constantly shifting alliances each with their own militia to ensure security.
108
 There 
are also several free-lance militias (warlords), more or less tied to a clan, who make their livelihood 
through booty and pillage.
109
 In a structural perspective warlords raison d‘etre is to take advantage of 
the lack of a state-structure to enrich themselves
110
, while state-structures militias have the political 
goal of securing security, welfare and representation for its ‗citizens‘. 111 Therefore these are under the 
control of the clan elders.
112
  Order and security is primarily based on this clan structure, with clan 
elders co-operating and negotiating with militia to ensure local police functions and external relations 
with other clans.
113
 This setup is interesting as the anarchy among clans resembles, and is basically a 
small-scale version of, the (realist) ‗anarchy among state‘-system.  
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3.2.3 Islam 
Another pillar of Somali society is Islam. Islam has deep roots in Somalia, due to the very old trade-
connection to Arabia. Because of this connection, the Somalis were converted to Islam very early after 
the prophet Mohammed died in 632AD, and remain to this day staunch Muslims by culture.
114
 Somalis 
have traditionally subscribed to the moderate Sufi interpretation of Islam, blending local traditions and 
culture with the religion.
115
 Parts of Sharia law are incorporated into Somali Customary law (Xeer) but 
unlike many more radical Islamic Arab countries, Islam has traditionally not been a significant political 
force.
116
 
Islam had a revival after the Somali state collapsed as some of the security, welfare and social duties of 
the now dysfunctional secular state institutions was taken over by Islamic organisations.
117
 The Islamic 
institutions that flourished after 1991 were mostly of locally based Somali origin, catering for Somali 
needs as no other functional structure were present. Among these were the Islamic Courts, who 
expanded their traditional role in family law to also include criminal law.
118
 The strong cultural 
attachment to Islam was later used by these Islamic Courts as a uniting factor when they united in a 
state-structure in 2006 – The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). 
 
Radical Islamist groups with external funding from the Gulf states began operating in the 1990‘s and 
have led to a proliferation of more extreme Wahhabis and Salafist views, and some militant jihadist 
organisations started to spring up.
119
 Al-Qaeda tried to establish itself in Somalia from 1991 but found 
it hard to operate in the anarchy.
120
 Contrary to popular opinion, Islam first became a prominent 
political force in Somalia in the mid-2000s.
121
 
 
The Islamic Courts united in the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006 to form a state structure. A 
very diverse union, the majority of courts are very moderate
122
, but some Jihadist courts were also part 
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of the UIC. They were however overthrown in an Ethiopian invasion shortly after (this will be 
discussed in detail later). The Ethiopian invasion in 2006 that destroyed the UIC also destroyed the 
moderate version of Islam, of which the majority of the UIC was following.
123
 The religious extremist 
groups, such as all-Shabaab, have since then taken over the fight against the Ethiopians, and have, 
inspired by al-Quada, started to use suicide attacks (which is something new to Somalia), and 
extremely strict Sharia law interpretations.
124
 
3.2.4 Conclusion Background 
3.2.4.1 Traditional clan mechanisms in state-structure formation 
Somali history and the Somalis‘ bad experience with central states, means that they are naturally 
suspicious towards central regimes. Instead they have retained and developed their highly functional 
traditional governance structure. This traditional governance-structure includes effective culturally-
based conflict resolution mechanism (wherein Islam plays a part). The Shir and Gurti mechanisms have 
also, in modern times, proved themselves effective in settling conflicts and paving the way for 
functioning state-structures (this will be described in detail in the Somaliland chapter.) The Somali 
Clan-Identity-structure gives strong identity and a settled framework for social (political) interaction. 
Somalis have historically learned to live either with a hostile state, or none-at-all, therefore their 
political loyalty is not based with the state, but with the clan, as the state is not the traditionally reliable 
provider of governance services. The clan and kinship system have historically done that. In order to 
construct a successful state-structure in Somalia, one has therefore to convince the Somalis that the new 
structure is not going to evolve into a too powerful and potential hostile central state. Traditional 
governance and conflict handling structures have to be transferred to the new structure as they are the 
only ones the Somalis have traditionally could rely on the represent their interests. Transferring them 
into the new structure therefore gives this a very high level of legitimacy. As the paper will show, the 
bottom-up state-structure of Somaliland has successfully used these traditional governance structures to 
construct a successful de facto state. The UIC also utilises locally founded traditional governance-
structure, with Islamic branding, and was somewhat successful in that. They however failed, as other 
(external) priorities in state-structure formations. 
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Somali Muslim identity was effectively used in 2006 to create the UIC. This was an attractive uniting 
factor used by the courts in the face of a common enemy - the US sponsored warlords and Christian 
Ethiopians - to form a state-structure to deliver governance services. Cultural ‗national‘ identity, 
whereby Islam identity plays a part, has therefore shown itself as a powerful uniting factor that can be 
mobilised. 
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4. Analysis – State-Structures 
 
4.1 Top-Down vs. Bottom-up Development of 
State-Structures 
In Somalia there are two basic driving forces behind the will to develop functioning state-structures. 
Structures that arise from below, or bottom-up structures, are locally constructed to serve local needs of 
the people living in the territory. The most basic service these structures provide is security - law and 
order for the population, but it also functions as a representative structure for ordinary people, and a 
framework for welfare. The top-down structures are constructed by initiative of the IS, political elites 
and external forces in order to establish a state that can serve their interests. Among their interest is the 
issue of international order as the IS cannot handle stateless territories and stateless citizens.
125
 This 
chapter will analyse how these two kinds of state-structures interact and conflict in Somalia. The first 
section will present the functioning bottom-up state-structure of Somaliland. Somaliland will be used as 
the blueprint to demonstrate how a bottom-up state arises by itself to meet local needs. After this 
section, the failure of the top-down (IS sponsored) state-structure in Somalia will be addressed. The 
history of the official sovereign government of Somalia, the TFG, will be explained and its raison 
d‘etre, the interests behind it and its governance track record will be analysed. The 2006 bottom-up 
state-structure in south-central Somalia, the UIC, will hereafter be presented. This was a successful 
locally based state-structure that effectively provided governance services and was the most 
functioning state-structure in south-central Somalia since 1991.
126
 This state-structure was however 
destroyed in an Ethiopian invasion. The reasons behind this attack, and the role the official TFG and IS 
played in this event will be addressed. This chapter will thereafter conclude on the reasons that 
Somaliland succeeded, while the UIC failed. This will be analysed with special emphasis on the role 
that the IS and external actors and interest play. How and why do local and IS interest in state-structure 
formation clash? 
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4.2 Somaliland – A Bottom-up De Facto State 
Somaliland in north-western Somalia is an example of a de facto state, a fully functioning state-
structure that exhibits full positive sovereignty. Created to serve local needs in a bottom-up process it 
provides state-services for its citizens. It is however not internationally recognised, and as such 
possesses no negative sovereignty. Somaliland is good example of the strength of local capabilities 
because it is built solely on local initiative through traditional Somali governance structures. 
Somaliland is the example that proves that locally anchored governance capacities can be united under 
local initiative and morphed into a fully functional de facto state that meets the international (IS) 
standard for governance capability. 
 
4.2.0.1 History of Somaliland 
Somaliland was established in 1897, when the territory became a British colony.
127
 It became 
independent in 1960 and remained so for five days until it merged with the former Italian Somalia and 
formed the Republic of Somalia.
128
 The area comprising Somaliland was marginalised and received 
little attention in the new unitary state of Somalia, which was centralised around Mogadishu. The 
central government allocated few development resources to the northern part of the new state.
129
 After 
1969, the military became the governing elite in Somalia. Under despotic central rule the north became 
marginalised both economically and politically. This caused discontent and rising insurgency in the 
north. This insurgency was brutally supressed by Barres central regime. A state of emergency was 
declared in the north in 1980
130
 and killing, rape and other draconian measures made the citizens in the 
north feel like second-class citizens in their own land.
131
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The failed war with Ethiopia over Ogaden in 1978 led to a massive influx of refugees from Ogaden, 
mainly of the Darod clan family.
132
 The Barre regime armed these refugees and used them to fight the 
Issaq based insurgence against the regime, in an example of clan politics.
133
 The insurgents turned into 
the Somali National Movement (SNM), with the goal of overthrowing Barre‘s brutal regime and 
bringing more just treatment for the north.
134
  
 
The gradual weakening of (central) state and government services to the north, combined with the loss 
of governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the oppressed local clans, led to an increasing reliance on 
self-help. People looked to local traditional social structures (the clan) to provide security, 
representation and welfare, which further weakened the official state-structure.
135
 As the renowned 
Somalia expert Lewis has pointed out, the rollback of Barre‘s unitary central-state did not produce 
anarchy but ‗an extreme degree of decentralisation‘.136 
 
From 1982 to May 1988 the SNM remained in small scale revolt.
137
 But Barre‘s increasingly brutal 
counter-insurgency tactics against the SNM from 1988 lead to a full-scale civil war in the north (as 
well as the rest of Somalia).
138
 The Barre regime used the full force of the army as well as the air force 
to cause massive destruction of the Issaq inhabited areas. The destruction in the civil war led to a 
feeling of ‗separateness‘ in Somaliland from the rest of Somalia.139 In line with the society the SNM 
was fighting for - the SNM‘s forces was led by civilian politicians (unlike in the south). The SNM 
forces were organised along clan lines in a decentralised structure, with the clan elders in command. 
This reflected traditional Somali governance structures and made sure that armed forces did not grow 
into warlords.
 140
  This mix of locally controlled and loyal fighters and a clearly identifiable enemy (the 
Somalia central state) effectively created a Somaliland identity and unity.
141
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4.2.1 Peace, Order and the Gradual Building of a State-Structure 
4.2.1.1 The Burco „Shir‟ Conference - De Facto Independence 
The Somalia civil war ended with the overthrow of Barre on the 27 January, 1991.
142
 In May 1991 the 
leaders of SNM and the clan elders met in the city Burco for the ‗Grand Conference of the Northern 
peoples‘.143 This is in line with ‗Shir‘ tradition of traditional Somali governance culture.144 (See Clan 
rule – Desert democracy chapter).  
 
Initially the Burco Elders in on the conference plan were to remain in union with the south, in line with 
the official SNM policy,
145
 but agitated crowds and public pressure from those protesting under the 
slogan ‗No more Mogadishu‘ forced the conference and SNM to seriously consider secession.146 The 
northern clans, especially the Issaq, felt that they had only suffered under union with the south and 
feared a possible future revival of an oppressive Mogadishu based central regime. The problem was 
seen to be an oppressive central state, and the feeling of alienation of anything coming out of 
Mogadishu was therefore seen as a threat to the inhabitants of Somaliland. Public pressure and the 
collective feeling of grief and alienation from Mogadishu, due to the suffering of the just ended civil 
war, led to the decision on the 18 May, 1991 to declare the Independence of Somaliland.
147
 
 
4.2.1.2 Speaking to the IS in its Own Language 
From a negative sovereignty perspective, independence had to be ‗sold‘ to the IS. Therefore the interim 
leaders of Somaliland tried to talk to the IS in their ‗own language‘, to increase the chance of being 
recognised as an independent sovereign state. Somaliland did not therefore officially ‗secede‘ but 
declared the 1960 union with Somalia (the former Italian Somalia) dead.
148
 They also referred to the 
fact that Somaliland, between declaring independence from Britain on the 26 June 1960 until the union 
with Italian-Somalia on the 1 July 1960 (five days), had been a sovereign state recognised by 35 states 
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including the US.
149
 Somaliland could therefore refer both to its‘ British colony status, independence 
and international recognition by the IS, as well as a voluntary union with Somalia, that they now chose 
to declare dissolved.  
 
4.2.1.3 The (Unsuccessful) Construction of a Government 
The Burco Shir concluded with the (consensus) decision of the elders to mandate the SNM to govern 
for two years, until a constitution could be formulated.
150
 Ahmed Tuur was chosen as interim 
president.
151
 The SNM was in 1991 the strongest ‗organisation‘ present, as the one with the best 
organisational capacity to rule Somaliland.
152
 It was however still, as we shall see, insufficient and 
unsuited to the job of ruling a new-born ‗state‘ that had just emerged from civil war. 
 
4.2.1.4 Traditional Local Governance rescue Somaliland 
The new government had a shaky start. Whenever it tried to rule or enforce its authority, it lead to clan 
clashes, as President Tuur‘s ‗government forces‘ were mainly comprised from his own family clan.153 
Tuur failed to create any local administrative structures
154
 and by 1992, Somaliland was on the edge of 
civil war.
155
 What saved Somaliland, and eventually brought it success, was not the official new 
‗government‘ but local founded (traditional) structures. Somaliland‘s success at building a functioning 
state structure was due to the fact that the new structure was built on top of traditional Somali 
governance system - the ‗pastoral democracy‘ and in accordance with social and cultural traditions.156 
When Tuur‘s government got armed classes to try and enforce the government‘s authority, the clan 
elders were brought in to (successfully) mediate the conflict.
157
 In the absence of any functioning 
government, local governing-meetings (structures) called Gurti - or councils of elders- were meeting ad 
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hoc (according to traditional social structure) to resolve the problems.
158
 Their job included managing 
militias, local administration, justice, mediating disputes, and interacting with international aid 
agencies. In short, they began performing tasks that a positive-sovereignty government should 
perform.
159
 They proved that while Tuur‘s government was officially in charge, it was unable to rule. 
Tuur‘s government failed because the existing governance-structures (that had handled the problems so 
far) were not incorporated into the government. This meant the government lacked legitimacy in the 
tribal society. 
 
4.2.1.5 Local Conditions 
Several factors helped Somaliland succeed. The SNM armed forces/militia were, unlike some rebel 
movements in the south, not a warlord faction but instead, locally founded forces, and under control of 
the clan elders
160
. This made them controllable and loyal to the local governance-structures, preventing 
them from turning into predatory warlords as in the south.
161
 SNM was furthermore not exclusively 
Issaq. Rather, it also included members of the Gadabursi, Dhulbante and Warsengeli clans, who all 
inhabited the northern areas.
162
 These clans were heavily intermarried and shared the same Xeer, 
governing war and social and cultural values. Somaliland was more homogenous in a clan perspective 
and therefore less divided than south-central Somalia.
163
 
 
4.2.1.6 The Boroma Conference, Government build on local Norms  
 The failure of the Tuur government meant that the years from 1991 to 1993 were pretty chaotic for 
Somaliland. In 1993 the tribal elders met at the Boroma conference to address the problems. The 
Boroma ‗Shir‘ conference from January 1993 to May 1993, is central to understand how Somaliland 
managed to build a functioning state-structure.
164
 The national convention of all the clans of 
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Somaliland, or Boroma conference, was a traditional ‗Shir‘.165 Although the Issaq clan was the 
dominating clan in Somaliland (and of the SNM who held government), the other clans, Gadabursi, 
Harti, Dhulbahante and Warsengeli were invited and deliberately given a determining role in the 
conference, in order to ensure success.
166
 The conference produced a blueprint for a government 
structure that was built on local governance-structure (a lesson learned from the failure of the Tuur 
government). The new government was constructed on top of the existing clan and social governance-
structure, and established a national ‗Xeer‘ (law)167 by consensus that guided inter-clan relationship and 
provided the basis for law and order.
168
 
 
The new structure, known as the ‗Beel‘ system was based on a president, an upper-house of non-
elected elders and a lower house of elected representatives.
169
 The traditional kinship social 
organisation of Somali society was thus reflected in this ‗hybrid‘ structure, as the upper house seats 
were allocated to clan elders in proportion to the size of their clans.
170
 The upper-house then elected the 
president and vice-president.
171
 The incorporation of the de facto leaders (elders) of the present society 
ensured a ‗clan balance‘ and left the elders to continue their traditional job as peacemakers and 
representatives of their clan
172. The upper house elder‘s responsibility was to ensure the demobilisation 
of the militias (a smart move, since the clan elders controlled the militias), ensuring law, order, stability 
and guarding moral and social values, through the creation and enforcement of the Xeer.
173
 As one 
elder of the upper house expressed: 
 
―Our task is to ensure security and reconciliation. The government‘s responsibility is 
management, administration and development…‖174  
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The Borama conference therefore established a state-structure based on Somali culture and values, and 
transferred already existing de facto law (Xeer) and the de facto governance-structures and leaders who 
already represented the people into new structure.
175
 This transfer of existing governance capability 
into the new ‗hybrid‘ structure gave it great legitimacy.176  
 
4.2.1.7 External Support 
Beyond local popularity Ethiopia has been supportive of Somaliland since its conception for several 
(good) reasons of self-interest. Somaliland maintains order on the border to Ethiopia. Somaliland has 
port facilities that are of value to Ethiopia, especially since Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia, as the 
Eritreans are hostile towards them (because of the civil war).
177
 Furthermore Somaliland is a vital 
element in Ethiopia‘s strategy of keeping Somalia divided178, so it cannot unite and pose a threat 
against Ethiopia.
179
 Therefore Ethiopia also refuses to (officially) recognise Somaliland. 
 
4.2.1.8 The Success Of The „Beel‟ Governance-structure 
The Borama conference produced valuable results. It facilitated order and the basis for a new state 
(structure) that evolved into a de facto state. The Beel-structure was originally meant to last only two 
years until a formal constitution could be made, but ended up lasting 10 years.
180
 The locally based 
Gurti governance systems were not isolated to the (big nation-wide) Borama conference but took place 
all over Somaliland, both small and big, and addressed a number of local and regional conflict areas. 
Traditional moderate Sufi-Islam also play a part in this governance-structure, namely as a guide and 
tool to sanction Gurti decisions and give them legitimacy. In this way Islam work as a highly 
constructive tool – in conjunction with Somali governance-culture.181 The success of this hybrid 
government system can be summed up in a quote by Carolyn Logan, a US diplomat who expressed that 
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the structure had created a: ―[U]nprecedented degree of interconnectedness between the state and 
society‖182 Somaliland has since its inception gradually developed itself into a fully functional 
democracy.
183
 In short Somaliland have transformed the ‗illiberal‘ (in the eyes of the IS) traditional 
Somali governance-structure that it was originally founded on into a democratic and economically 
liberal state, whose governance the IS can only approve of. 
 
4.2.1.9 Leave Them Alone and they will Succeed? 
Several authors are of the opinion that a positive factor in Somaliland‘s creation was the lack of a state 
and (lootable) resources including aid. This meant that there were no resources to fight for control over, 
and this gave the clans an advantage in corporation instead of competing or fighting a zero-sum game 
over exploitable resources.
184
 This meant that local initiative and interest in social and political order 
could thrive. Seth Kaplan argues that the bottom-up process in the formation of Somaliland was 
possible because the lack of a state (the state of Somalia had collapsed in 1991), as it allowed local clan 
elders to meet in Gurti and resolve the problems, without any outside (or top-down) political agenda or 
pressure.
 185
  This gave the clans in Somaliland a common interest in working and staying together.
186
 
Mark Bradbery express it this way: ―[B]y removing the state as a primary object of conflict, social 
relations could be addressed through customary institutions.‖187 In short local governance structures 
will do the job if they are ‗allowed‘ to do so. 
 
4.2.1.10 Local Imitative Equals Local Responsibility – The One Who Lives Quietly Lives Well 
The importance in giving  local capabilities and conflict handling mechanisms time and peace to allow 
them to solve local problems on their own terms, can be seen by the fact that, south-central Somalia, 
being the focus of the media and IS attention did not develop such a governance-structure. The lack of 
external resources in Somaliland meant that the governance-structures were responsible to the local 
people as they were their source of income. That the local society is the source of income for the state-
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structure controlling is therefore an important part in keeping the government focused on solving the 
people‘s problems.188 In south-central Somalia the massive influx of foreign aid from the IS fed the 
predatory warlords, fuelled clan feuds and produced no positive results.
189
 The lack of IS focus and 
attention on Somaliland allowed them to freely form their state without external pressure or interests. 
 
4.2.2 Successful State-Structure Building 
Somaliland‘s state-structure building has produced a very successful de facto state. The original ‗Beel‘ 
system has gradually been transformed into a full-fledged democratic governance structure, with 
regular and peaceful (western style) democratic elections. The 2005 ‗House of Representatives‘ 
elections were reported by international election observers to be the: ―[F]reest and most transparent 
democratic exercises ever staged in the horn of Africa‖190 
 
The original traditional way of representation through (unelected) clan elders have in Somaliland, 
successfully been gradually reformed through local initiative into an electoral-democracy that meets 
international standards. The IS norms desire just such a democratic structure in the territory of the 
‗sovereign‘ state of Somalia. Despite this, the UN (who have sponsored state-building in south-central 
Somalia) has refused to even acknowledge, let alone support, the process in Somaliland
191
 because the 
territorial container is not an already recognised sovereign state.  This is despite the impressive results 
that Somaliland has shown by improving security, building a democracy, and facilitating Economic 
growth (also in a neo-liberal (IS-norm) governance perspective). 
 
4.2.2.1 Successful Positive Sovereignty does not Automatically Translate into Negative Sovereignty 
Somaliland‘s homemade state-structure has developed well and is considered a great success. The new 
Somaliland state however remain unrecognised, due to the IS state-centric focus and its unwillingness 
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to allow formation of new states in existing (sovereign) territories. Therefore Somaliland possesses no 
negative sovereignty. This means that it is not accepted as a player and is unrepresented internationally 
in the UN. The UN and especially the African Union (AU) is generally unwilling to de-legitimise the 
already recognised post-colonial borders, and therefore Somaliland remains a de facto state, despite the 
fact that it is exhibiting great positive sovereignty, as Scott Pegg defines it (see theory).
192
  
 
4.2.2.2 Case for Independence 
Somaliland remains unrecognised, due to the norms of the IS. Several states, most prominently the US, 
have informally hinted that recognising Somaliland would be beneficial. The US is becoming more 
‗practically‘ orientated about de facto states due to the extreme degree of security-focus that arose from 
9/11.
193
 
  
In 2006 the US military mission ‗Combined task force – Horn of Africa‘, with the undertaking of 
capturing or killing terrorists in the area, had a meeting. The consensus about Somaliland among all 
(US and local) participants was that Somaliland was the: ―first constitutional Muslim democracy in the 
Horn of Africa……. [and a] proven partner in the GWOT‖194.  This opinion was backed up by Dan 
Simpson, the former US ambassador to Somalia who stated: ―It is… definitively time to recognize the 
independence of Somaliland‖195 
 
The US therefore sees a recognised Somaliland as a benefit to further its own security, a strong (selfish) 
argument for breaking the territorial integrity norm of the IS. Likewise the AU concluded in a fact-
finding mission in 2005 that Somaliland‘s case for independence was: ―unique and self-justified‖196 
The AU however remains divided on the issue as several of its member-states are against, most notably 
Ethiopia. Djibuti is against due to its fear of trade-competition from a strong Somaliland. The Arab 
states are negative as well along with the most western states.
197
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Despite that Somaliland is not recognised it is however accepted as a de facto reality - and proven 
(reliable) cooperating partner of the IS. Somaliland uses this to further its agenda for recognition. In 
2004 a Somaliland official was invited to speak in the British of Commons. Here he stressed that 
Somaliland was fully living up to the Montevideo Convention on the right of duties of states.
198
 
 
4.2.2.3 Why Negative-Sovereignty Matters 
The reasons that recognition (negative sovereignty recognised statehood) matters for Somaliland is that 
Somaliland cannot receive bilateral and multilateral help through international institutions without 
having sovereign state status. Somaliland can therefore for example not borrow money in the World 
Bank, IMF and African Development bank. Its currency is not valid internationally, and insurance and 
investment in Somaliland is therefore lacking because of Somaliland‘s uncertain legal status.199 Both 
representation and welfare therefore suffers, as the country remains unrepresented in international 
forums, such as the UN, and the Somaliland passport is not valid for international travel. A lot of 
practical problems regarding the practical running of a ‗state‘ therefore arise out of problems with the 
lack of international recognition. The representation part of a state-structure therefore cannot be fully 
fulfilled without negative sovereignty recognised. This is despite the fact that Somaliland is in fact 
living up to (almost) all IS neoliberal norms of statehood. The exception is that the territorial container 
is not the already recognised one and further, that the formation has been bottom-up.
200
  
 
4.2.3 Somaliland’s Merits 
Somaliland is a clear example of a locally arisen state-structure, created by the locals, to meet local 
governance demands. Besides that it is constructed on local traditional governance structures. The 
importance of this cannot be underestimated. As seen by President Tuur‘s unsuccessful initial two year 
rule after independence - any ‗official‘ top-down government that tries to enforce its authority will 
meet opposition as they are not considered a neutral actor, but instead a representative of the (special)  
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interest of a single clan or actor. The local elder ‗Gurti‘ councils proved to be able to mediate and 
handle conflicts between clans and groups. This was because of their legitimacy as the proper 
(political) representatives for the population. This political unit of legitimacy is in Somali culture – the 
clan/kinship system, as outlined earlier in the background chapter. This political clan-culture also 
possesses some special mediation technique - the ‗Shir‘ and ‗Gurti‘, which is highly effective in 
mediating conflicts. The Beel system was successfully built on the success of the existing political 
culture and their representatives - the elders. These Elders were given their natural job as guardians of 
the peace in the new government. The Beel government Hybrid was smart in that it utilised existing 
(clan) governance structures, but also introduced (western neo-liberal) parliamentary elections. This 
allowed Somaliland to gradually open up its governance to multi-party elections and has produced what 
foreign observers today call the most democratic regime in East Africa.
201
 This gradual reforming 
towards neo-liberal Westphalian (IS) norms improves Somaliland chance of obtaining recognition and 
negative sovereignty in the future – a move that would be beneficial to the IS too. 
 
The case of Somaliland shows that local social-capacities are of vital value in the construction of a 
successful state-structure. Local capacity ensures that the structure has a very high degree of legitimacy 
because existing and functioning governance-structure and (clan) loyalties can be transferred into the 
‗new‘ state-structure as a part of it. This is better than trying to build alternative and new structures and 
then converting people‘s loyalty to it is. Incorporating existing structures secures local ownership to 
and a feeling of responsibility towards the new states-structure. This local process can only happen if 
there is time, peace and will (and lack of external spoilers) to let this process happen, as the 
reconciliation-process is fragile and easy to spoil in post-war societies. All these pre-requisites were 
present in the formation of Somaliland, due to the lack of interest by the IS as they were focussed on 
the problems in south-central Somalia. Somaliland‘s success in building a successful de facto state 
have however not translated into recognised negative sovereignty, as several states are against this for 
their own geo-political reasons. Somaliland has overall proved a great success, as it is effectively 
delivering state-services such as security, representation and welfare.
202 
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4.3 The Failure in South-Central Somalia.  
4.3.1 Intro Bottom-up vs. Top-down State-Structures in Conflict. The 
People vs. External Actors and Interests. 
In south-central Somalia, only a single bottom-up state-structure has emerged. This structure however 
came into direct conflict with the IS and its state-structure the UIC. The conflict between the two and 
the result of this struggle will be outlined and explained in this chapter. 
 
From 1991 to 2000 the sovereign state of Somalia had no official or functional government. In 2000 the 
IS arranged for the re-appearance of a sovereign government for Somalia the TFG. This government is 
a total quasi-government, with no positive sovereignty (actual power). The TFG did therefore not 
manage to govern anything. After 9/11 the US needed to ‗fight terrorism‘ in Somalia and as the TFG 
could not assist the US in this (in line with its‘ official obligation to the IS as sovereign) the US paid 
warlords to assist the US in its Global War on Terror (GWOT). This increased funding to the warlords, 
and their brutal ravaging led to a massive backlash among a local governance structure - the Islamic 
Courts. In light of this common enemy, the Islamic Courts united in the UIC and successfully defeated 
the warlords in early 2006. The UIC consolidated their ‗monopoly of the legitimate use of violence‘ in 
a functioning state-structure, and bought law and order back to south-central Somalia. Due to the 
fractured nature of the newly united Islamic courts, a unified leadership of the UIC did not materialise. 
Because of these various factions in the UIC (both moderate and jihadist) made public statements on 
behalf of the UIC, some of them containing extreme jihadist rhetoric. Because of this Ethiopia and the 
US saw the UIC as a direct ‗terrorist‘ threat to their own security. Ethiopia therefore invaded south-
central Somalia in 2006 and removed the UIC from power. In the aftermath of the invasion the radical 
jihadist al-Shabaab, who had formerly been part of the UIC, gained legitimacy at the expense of the 
moderate (majority) faction of the UIC. Al-Shabaab started to conduct a brutal insurgency campaign, 
against Ethiopia and the TFG, with inspiration from al-Qaeda. In short the IS ‘management’ of Somalia 
fostered a radical global Jihadi group. 
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4.3.2 State-Structures in South-Central Somalia 
Unlike the success story of Somaliland, bottom-up state structures in the other parts of Somalia have 
not survived long. In south central Somalia, the situation has been described with the word chaos by 
international observers with no functioning state-structure.
203
 But why have no bottom-up structures 
succeeded there? Especially considering that the societal social-structure is fundamentally the same that 
exists in Somaliland? The answer is that such a structure has arisen, but has failed, due to external 
interest and interests of political elites. Spoilers have easy play in destroying these fragile structures in 
the state building process. The interests of the ordinary people versus the interest of rich and external 
actors are in the case of state-structures in Somalia conflicting.  
 
4.3.2.1 Post 1991 State Collapse  
The situation in south-central Somalia after the civil war from 1988 and the state collapse in 1991 was 
markedly different than in Somaliland.
204
 In Somaliland a single rebel movement, the SNM was in 
control, while in Somalia, several militias and warlords was roaming the land. In Somaliland, the SNM 
and militias had a high degree of public support and the clan elders controlled the SNM militias. In 
Somalia, several predatory ‗greed based‘ militias and independent warlords were operating, making a 
living by looting civilians.
205
 The humanitarian catastrophe that led to the ill-fated UN ‗Operation 
Restore Hope‘206 brought food aid and other resources into Somalia, presenting perfect looting 
opportunities, and hence a strengthening of the warlords position.
 207
  After the UN mission ended in 
1995, the warlords reasserted their prominence, as they were the strongest actors in Somalia. 
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4.3.3 Failed IS Top-down Attempts 
In a state-structure perspective, the discrepancy between negative and positive sovereignty is very clear 
in Somalia. The focus of the IS has always been a central government in order to make sure that 
Somalia could fulfil its duties towards to IS as a sovereign state, in a top-down manner. Fourteen such 
top-down sponsored state-building attempts have been attempted in Somalia from 1991 to 2008.
208
 The 
way the IS have tried to do this has however been clumsy. An Example of this is the ‗United Nations 
Operation in Somalia‘ (UNOSOM) intervention in 1992, which failed in strengthening the state, 
according to Mark Bradbury because: 
 
―UNOSOM was a bureaucratic, state-centric body constituted by governments, with a mandate 
to re-establish a central government……..International diplomacy did nothing to rein in the 
predatory forces which unleashed the violence‖209 
 
The IS focus is a formal mediation with warlords and local leaders in order to secure a ceasefire and 
power sharing deal.
210
 This top-down approach, that has worked well in some states, such as the former 
Yugoslavia, has proved ineffective in Somalia due to the local (decentralised) governance tradition and 
the fact that the leaders that participated in power-sharing did not genuinely represent the Somali 
population but rather, special interests.
211
 The following section of this paper will concern itself with 
the present official negative-sovereignty government established in 2000 (the first since state collapse 
in 1991), in order to compare its performance with Somaliland‘s bottom up state-structure.212 
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4.4 The TFG – the Official „Negative Sovereignty‟ 
Government of Somalia 
4.4.0.1 Intro to the Transitional National/Federal Government (TFG) 
Unlike Somaliland, Somalia is a quasi-state. The government of this quasi-state the TFG is 
internationally recognised as sovereign and is represented in the UN, receiving a sizable amount of aid 
from the IS. Beyond that it (officially) possesses negative sovereignty over all of the territory of the 
(former) Republic of Somalia, including Somaliland, which means that in the eyes of the IS the de 
facto state of Somaliland is officially a part of the quasi-state of Somalia.  
 
The government of the sovereign (quasi) state of Somalia was re-establishment in 2000 at the initiative 
of the IS, officially in the form of the regional organisation IGAD
213
, hosted by the President of 
Djibouti.
214
 Officially called a ‘reconciliation and peace conference‘, the goal was to (re)form a united 
Somalia government/state.
215
 Representatives were invited from all clans and from the ‗civil society‘, 
meaning elders and religious leaders.
 216
 Warlords were also invited as‘ representatives‘ thereby giving 
them legitimacy.
217
 The conference produced the ‗Transitional National Government‘ (TNG). The 
conferences and the TNG were supported, recognised (and paid for) by the IS in this case the UN, US, 
EU, Egypt, Italy, Libya, some Arab countries and other states.
218
 
 
The TNG was also recognised as representing Somalia abroad, as its leaders were invited, received and 
treated as the legitimate leaders representing Somalia. The UN invited the TNG‘s president to the UN 
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Millennium Summit, as the official representation from Somalia.
219
 Likewise the TNG was 
acknowledged as the rightful government by the ‗Organisation for African Unity‘ (the later AU) in 
2000, and also gained recognition from IGAD and the Arab League.
220
 Recognised negative 
sovereignty was therefore effectively achieved. Despite the strong support from these states of the IS 
the TNG only managed to control a few streets in Mogadishu and was very unpopular among the 
Somali population.
221
 It was never effectively functional. In 2002 the same basic ‗state-structure‘ 
construction was attempted revived, this time with the warlords as the primary actors, as the 
Transitional Federal government (TFG)
222
 (paid for by the EU and UN). This, however, has not 
changed the quasi-governmental performance.
223
 Ever since, the TFG have been the ‗official 
government‘ of Somalia and have played a significant role in influencing the situation in Somalia. The 
TFG is totally dependent on external resources, and who it ‗represents‘ can be questioned (which will 
be discussed in depth later). 
 
4.4.0.2 Why the TFG? 
As discussed in the theory section, the IS demands and feels they need a government to hold 
responsible for what happens in the territory of the state of Somalia. Optimally, one that lived up to the 
IS desire for a state: A liberal democratic government/state, within the existing territorial boundaries of 
the existing sovereign state, and build on the reformed institutions of the existing government/state. In 
the case of Somalia, the traditional neo-liberal state-building project brings about several problems. 
First of all, the modern liberal state building literature has no idea of how to build capacity from scratch 
when no government exists to start building on. Somalia is a collapsed state, so there is no (functioning 
or official)
224
 domestic state institutions/government to reform or build on. The IS have handled this 
problem by ad hoc creating the TFG, as a basis of (official) legitimate government with negative 
recognised sovereignty, to attempt to build capacity. 
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4.4.0.3 TFG‟s Performance and Actors 
 The TFG however failed in governing anything through positive sovereignty.
225
 The interest groups of 
the TFG are easily identified. It represents the people in it and the (external) actors who fund it. In this 
case that is a mix of opportunistic warlords and local clan leaders, and the states of the IS who fund it 
out of a genuine interest of order in the IS.  
 
The TFG‘s actors (both external states and domestic warlords) are pursuing their own interests as a part 
of the TFG policy and several of them are not (in reality) interested in building a strong state or 
improving the condition for ordinary Somalis.
226
 The opportunistic warlords and clan leaders who are 
in the TFG see their interest served by supporting the IS top-down, foreign sponsored state-building 
attempts.
 227
 The international recognition the TGF enjoys from the IS, secures that foreign resource 
and financial aid continuing to flow in their direction, giving them wealth, legitimacy and power.
228229
 
In practice however the entrepreneurial warlords are not interested in the success of the state-project as 
a lasting peace, as that peace would limit their predatory and looting/extortion business, which can only 
thrive in the absence of a (functioning) state-structure. 
 
On top of that, the Somali societal structure, which is decentralised and locally rooted, is not naturally 
compatible with such a top-down approach, and therefore the TFG is not perceived by ordinary 
Somalis as representing them
230
 Because of this the TFG remains illegitimate in the eyes of most 
ordinary Somalis, as they (rightfully) do not feel it is representing their interests. 
 
4.4.1 External Interference and Interests. 
The TFG is heavily influenced by external actor rivalry, clan rivalry and special interest groups. For 
example, the TFG ‗officials‘ are mainly from the Darod clan231. The TFG gives them resources and 
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opportunities to promote their own power, but also means that other clans that have quarrels with the 
Darod clan will automatically be negatively inclined to the TFG. These ‗clan feuds‘ are normal in 
Somalia, but it seems like the IS fails to understand this aspect of Somali society, and (presumably 
unwillingly) promotes existing clan division through the TFG (instead as fulfilling intentions of 
mending divisions) by giving certain ‗clan representatives‘ recognition and resources as the ‗legal‘ 
international representatives of Somalia.
232
 
 
Neighbouring states are trying to support their local proxies to promote their own interests.
233
 Beyond 
that several important actors such as the UIC and Somaliland are not represented in the TFG, making it 
unrepresentative of the real situation in Somalia. The TFG‘s actual policy, the will to gain Somalia-
wide domestic legitimacy, is therefore virtually non-existent,
234
 and the TFG can be said to be held up 
and exist only because of the IS and the special (geo-political) interests of the actors in it. It is, 
therefore, also more an expression of the will of the states of the IS and actors that enjoy their support, 
than the will of the people of Somalia. Understanding these various actors‘ interests for joining this 
official state formation is therefore important in order to understand the conditions that affect the 
(formation and destruction) of state-structures in Somalia.  
 
This external interference is however nothing new. Somali affairs have always been influenced by 
‗international affairs‘, not at least because of Somalia‘s history. The ‗national‘ state of Somalia that 
was established in 1960 left significant minorities of ethnic Somalis living in neighbouring states. 
235
 
The nation-building project of building a Somali state was therefore incomplete, a fact that has fuelled 
Pan-somali nationalism since independence. This means that (neighbouring) foreign states have a 
strong interest in who holds power in Somalia, as it affects their territories which are inhabited by 
ethnic Somalis.
236
 The colonial legacy is the root of this problem, as all current (international) 
territorial border-demarcations that affect Somalia were originally drawn by the colonial powers 
without any Somali consultation or influence.
237
 The ‗spill over‘ effect from Somalia is therefore 
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considerable. All the neighbouring and regional states therefore have their own interests they want to 
promote in Somalia.  
 
Historically, international geo-political development has also affected Somalia heavily. During the 
Cold War Somalia was first a proxy of the USSR and then the US. After state collapse in 1991, briefly 
humanitarian concerns were the reason for external interests. During the 1990‘s and especially since 
9/11, the failed states (discourse) has taken prominence and the IS has increasingly viewed 
‗ungoverned spaces‘ as a threat out of a fear that they could become possible breeding ground for 
terrorists.
238
 Furthermore piracy from the shores of Somalia has begun to affect international trade and 
forced the IS to take the situation in Somalia into account.
239
 A sizable Somali diaspora community 
also exists, because of the violent history of Somalia. Remittances from this diaspora living abroad can 
influence the domestic situation, and be a political (pressure) tool as well.
240
  
 
4.4.1.1 Ethiopia‟s Interests 
Ethiopia is the regional ‗superpower‘ and is intensely concerned with the situation in Somalia. Due to 
the imperial/colonial legacy the Somali populated Ogaden province is part of Ethiopia, and dispute 
over this province caused the war with Somalia in 1977.
241
 Due to the ethnic bonds between the ethnic 
Somalis in the Ogaden province and Somalia, all events in Somalia have a ‗spill over‘ on Ethiopia. The 
sheer anarchy of Somalia, during and after the fall of Barre, affected Ethiopia because of the spill over 
of lawlessness over the long and open border. Ethiopia would optimally like to see a strong pro-
Ethiopian government in Somalia, but due to historical Somali-animosity towards Ethiopia, it 
acknowledges that any future strong and united Somalia government will probably be anti-Ethiopian. 
An example of this is the 1977 Somalia-Ethiopia war that was instigated by Barre partly as a tool for 
creating internal legitimacy, by appealing to Somali animosity towards the (Christian) Ethiopia. 
 
                                                 
238
 Møller, ―The Somali Conflict: The role of external actors,‖ 14. 
239
 Ibid., 5. 
240
 Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, 132. 
241
 Møller, ―The Somali Conflict: The role of external actors,‖ 9. 
60 
 
Ethiopia is therefore actively pursuing a policy of keeping Somalia weak and divided
242
, supporting 
both the TFG
243
 who is totally dependent on Ethiopian assistance, de facto, and especially in the eyes 
of ordinary Somalis, an Ethiopian puppet regime.
244
 Ethiopia, therefore in practice, despite its official 
(and very active) support for the TFG‘s official goal of a strong central government in Somalia, would 
not like to see that happen, as it could potentially create a strong state in the future that could be(come) 
hostile to Ethiopia. By officially supporting the TFG as the recognized official state, having 
sovereignty over the whole of Somalia, while at the same time supporting Somaliland
245
, who refuse to 
participate in any ‗reconciliatory‘ talks about a unified government of Somalia, Ethiopia has effectively 
made sure that a unified government of Somalia can ever emerge (according to the IS norms)
246
, this is 
a part of Ethiopia‘s ‗divide and rule‘ policy towards Somalia. 
 
4.4.1.2. Total Negative Sovereignty, No Positive Sovereignty. The TFG‟s Governance Performance. 
The TFG does not live up to the definition of a Weberian state, defined as possessing a legitimate 
(actual) monopoly of violence. As this section will highlight, the TFG performance as a functional 
government for its ‗citizens‘ is virtually absent. It does however still play a significant role as the 
official government, using the tools and privileges that its status as official sovereign offers, to 
influence the situation in Somalia to the advantage of the actors controlling the TFG. When the TFG 
was established it was unable to even settle in Somalia, as it did not control any territory there. Initially 
it therefore settled in Kenya. From there it used its right as the negative sovereign of Somalia to request 
for 20,000 troops from the UN and AU to protect it as it established government in Somalia.
247
 The AU 
and UN however refused to send troops. Instead the TFG took up an offer of Ethiopian military 
protection, and settled in January 2006 in Baidoa in south-western Somalia.
248
 But in line with its claim 
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to legitimate sovereignty the TFG denied being under the protection of the Ethiopian military on TFG‘s 
‗own‘ soil.249  
 
4.4.1.3 The TFG in Mogadishu Thanks to an Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia! 
In December 2006, after the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia
250
, the TFG was able to relocate to 
Mogadishu under heavy Ethiopian protection. After setting up its government in Mogadishu the TFG 
proved completely unable to govern anything. The TNG was totally isolated in Mogadishu, and 
attempts to instigate the ‗reconciliation‘ process that the IS was hoping for during ‗talks‘ in Djibouti in 
2008, totally failed as several of the strongest (actual) actors in Somalia refused to participate, 
including the (now defeated) UIC, al-Shabaab and Somaliland.
251
 South-central Somalia therefore 
rapidly descended into chaos again, as the TFG in no way could replace the UIC state-structure positive 
sovereignty performance.
252
  
 
4.4.1.4 The IS reaction to the Ethiopian Invasion and the „return‟ of the TFG 
From the perspective of the IS (especially the US), the Ethiopian victory over the UIC was seen, as US 
diplomat declared it, a: ‗[W]indow of opportunity to promote reconciliation and revive a functioning 
government in Somalia‘253 Then US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, was even more optimistic 
stating: ―The Somali people….. have a historic opportunity to begin to move beyond two decades of 
warlordism, extreme violence and humanitarian suffering‖254 
 
 In fact the Ethiopians (with US and IS blessing) had just destroyed the best functioning and most 
promising bottom-up state structure in south-central Somalia since 1991, and brought chaos to the area. 
If the UIC had been left to itself there is some indication that the moderate parts could maybe have 
                                                 
249
 Ibid. 
250
 The Ethiopian invasion will be explained later in the UIC chapter 
251
 Møller, ―The Somali Conflict: The role of external actors,‖ 15. 
252
 Møller, ―Somalia: From Stateless Order to Talibanisation?,‖ 4. 
253
 Menkhaus, ―The crisis in Somalia,‖ 383. 
254
 Ibid. 
62 
 
prevailed over the jihadist part of the organisation, leaving the ordinary people (and the IS) better off, 
with a functional state-structure.
255
 
 
4.4.1.5 Interest of the IS in the TFG 
The IS (in reality) remains indifferent to the living conditions of the ordinary Somali‘s. The states in 
the IS instead insistently focus on their own agenda, namely national security through a friendly 
government (in an ideal world) to create a sovereign State corresponding to IS norms.
256
  In order to 
promote these interests, and despite the obvious incapability of the TFG, the IS vigorously continues to 
support and promote the TFG as the legitimate and recognised government of Somalia, as it served the 
interests of the IS.
257
 An example of this is that the Ethiopian invasion was officially not an invasion as 
the Ethiopian troops was ‗invited‘ to destroy the UIC by the official sovereign government of Somalia 
– the TFG.258 
 
4.4.1.6 The TFG‟s Performance  
The TFG possess negative sovereignty but absolutely no positive sovereignty. It is therefore a blueprint 
on a quasi-state/ failed state, and displays absolutely no positive sovereignty governance capability. It 
is actively created through the initiative of the IS, as IS needs to have somebody that is officially 
responsible for territory. In practice the TFG however controls no territory and exist only on paper. 
From this position it represents the interests of the IS and local Somalian actors who use the TFG to 
further their own (private) interests. This meant that it has no legitimacy among the population in 
Somalia, who (rightfully) see it as a tool for foreign interests. These foreign interest is not really 
interested in the well-being of the ordinary Somalian, but only in furthering their own security interests. 
Furthermore the TFG is constructed top-down and is therefore incompatible with traditional Somali 
governance culture.  
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The IS is fully aware of this, but due to the actors in the TFG and there (selfish security) interest in 
Somalia, it is incapable or unwilling to see the possible strength in alternative state structures, such as 
the UIC, who possibly could have turned out less extreme than originally perceived.  
 
 
4.5 Bottom up attempts in Somalia, the Union of 
Islamic Courts (UIC) 
From 1991 to 2006, south central Somalia was without any functioning full-scale state-structures.
259
 
The fighting and feuds among the non-united clans and warlords left the country in disarray without 
any uniting structure. Local traditional governance structures filled some of the governance gap, in lack 
of a state to perform these services. Among these local governance structures was the Islamic Courts 
who, due to external pressure, decided to united into a state-structure in 2006 - the Union of Islamic 
Courts (UIC). 
 
4.5.0.1 Origin of the Islamic Courts 
Islam and Islamic law have always been an important part of Somali culture and tradition, but not as a 
directly political force. Islamic law has traditionally always been used as part of Somali governance 
tradition. The Islamic Courts was originally independent and locally based courts, used as an 
instrument by clan elders (mostly in urban areas) in conjunction with customary Somali culture and 
tradition (of which Islam is a part). Local communities established courts mainly based on the moderate 
Sufi interpretation of Islam, and these courts spread over Somalia after the state collapse in 1991 to 
maintain order and justice, due to the lack of official functioning institutions after the state collapse.
260
. 
Originally these independent local courts were mainly concerned with family law, but have been 
expanded to also include criminal law (as there was a governance need here).
 261
 The Courts were 
reflecting their society, and most were subscribing to moderate traditional Sufi inspired courts. During 
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the 1990‘s, various Salafist and Wahhabis radical groups such as all-Shabaab were able to establish 
courts.
262
 This was possible due to financial assistance and influence from the Islamic Gulf States,
263
 
 
4.5.0.2 The GWOT, Somalia a US Security Concern, the US hire Warlords to Fight Terrorists 
Since 9/11 the US have seen the ‗ungoverned‘ territory of Somalia as a danger to US National Security 
and as such, have deemed such areas was as potential safe havens for Al-Qaeda. The GWOT has 
securitised Somalia, as failed states were seen as places to foster terrorism.
264
 The Bush 
administration‘s response to the perceived threat was in 2006 to: 
 
―[W]ork with those elements that will help us root out al-Qaeda and to prevent Somalia 
becoming a safe haven for terrorists, and we are doing this in the interests of protecting 
America‖265. 
 
The US sponsored the ‗Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism‘ (ARPCT or 
ATA) by buying warlords in Mogadishu. CIA and its hired Private Military Company (PMC) ‗Select 
Armor‘ handed out 150.000USD pr. month in cash to buy various Warlords corporation,266 with the 
goal of getting them to fight Islamic terrorists.
267
 The US interest was to get the ATA to fight the Al-
Ittihad al Islamia (AIAI)
268
 and to hunt down three suspected terrorists that the US claimed were 
involved in the 1998 bombings of the US embassy in Kenya and the 2002 hotel bombings in the same 
place. The US accused the Islamic Courts and Al-Shabaab for hiding and protecting these 
‗terrorists‘.269 The evidence that terrorists were hiding in Somalia at that time was rather weak270, but 
the US and the IS felt unsafe with ‗failed states‘ and assumed that the lack of an official state-structure 
with positive-sovereignty implied a safe haven for terrorists.
271
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4.5.0.3 The US godfather to the Union of Islamist Courts 
Ironically this US initiative was the direct catalyst for the first successful bottom-up constructed state-
structure in Somalia – the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).272 The reasons for the construction of the 
UIC was the old proverb ‗Nothing unites internally as external enemies‘ and the US decision to fund 
the warlords in the ATA (and TFG)  was the uniting factor that led the hitherto disunited and locally 
based Islamic Courts to unite in the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). In short the previous scattered and 
independent courts were united in the UIC due to a common dislike of US and Ethiopian influence in 
Somalia, as the two countries were (correctly) seen as supporting the warlords (and the TFG) that were 
causing insecurity and death to the ordinary Somalians.
273
 The UIC was therefore formed as an 
attractive alternative to provide a (locally) legitimate regime (as Weber defined it) that provided basic 
security and order to ordinary people.  
 
4.5.1 Islam as the Uniting Factor in a De Facto State 
The UIC‘s uniting factors - Islam, pan-Somali nationalism and anti- Ethiopianism was seen by many 
Somalis to be a good alternative to clannism.
274
 The strongest support for the UIC was in among the 
Haweiy clan, partly as a response to the Darod dominated TFG (again traditional Somali clan 
rivalry).
275
  The UIC also saw support from various local clan militias and businessmen as they viewed 
the UIC as an attractive state-structure that providing law, order and peace.
276
 The traditional Somali 
kinship culture was also an important factor in the UIC, and for many UIC leaders, the ‗Islamic 
branding‘ was merely a name used as a (popular) uniting factor.277  
 
The feeling that the Christian Ethiopia, and its ally, the US, was treating ordinary Somalis unjustly, 
meant that Islamic Jihad rhetoric against the infidel suppressers was used in conjunction with 
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traditional Somali anti-Ethiopian nationalism, and dislike for the US-sponsored warlords. This mix of 
local anchoring and popular appeal to traditionally uniting Somali cultural opinion and prejudices, 
combined with the good positive sovereignty results produced by the UIC, proved a powerful uniting 
factor.
278
 
 
4.5.1.1 Diverse Union 
The union of previous local and independent Islamic courts meant that some of the courts were 
adhering to more extreme Salafist or Wahabist interpretations of Islam.
 279
 Some of these utilised a 
more draconic and inflexible version of sharia, which was brought to Somalia from Saudi Arabia.
280
 
This approach is viewed by many Somalis, as un-Somali, and has (until very recently) only had very 
limited success in widely becoming established in Somalia.
281
  
 
The only important Islamic movement of a somewhat radical sort until the mid-2000‘s was Al-Ittihad 
al Islamia (AIAI),
282
 which has its roots in the Muslim youth movement from the 1960‘s  and in 1984 
merged to form the Somali Islamic Union.
283
 The UIC was however virtually extinct by 1997, and only 
operated some minor Islamic charities. In spite of this, its leader, Sheik Aways, was included on the US 
and UN terrorist lists after 9/11.
284
 This possibly gave him the legitimacy to later to later claim an 
important leadership position in the radical wing of the UIC. The events after 9/11 have however given 
radical Islamist militant organisations more legitimacy (external funding)
285
 and backing, which is 
reflected in the union-nature of the UIC.
286
 The most extreme of these groups is Al-Shabaab. Al-
Shabaab means ‗youth‘ and is a radical jihadi militant organisation.  
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4.5.2 The Union of Islamic Courts Takes Control 
4.5.2.1 To UIC kicks the ATA and Warlords Out. 
The UIC was ‗officially‘ formed in 2006 and in 
February 2006 the UIC started a full scale battle 
against the ATA and TFG. By June they had taken 
over Mogadishu and quickly extended their control 
to the most of south-central Somalia, controlling the 
whole of Somalia except, Somaliland, Puntland and 
some small enclaves by the end of 2006.
287
 The US 
anti-terrorist initiative had effectively facilitated the 
takeover of Somalia by the UIC. This gave south-
central Somalia its first major functioning state-
structure since the state collapse in 1991.
288
 
 
4.5.2.2 The Legitimate Monopoly of violence, 
through „Performance Legitimacy‟ 
The new Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was very 
successful in providing policing, judicial services 
and order to the local communities based on the 
independent Sharia courts. This was backed up by a 
strong UIC militia.
289
 The UIC was successful in taking over the local warlord‘s militias and weapons 
and centralising the monopoly of violence, under the courts leadership. This was part of a broader plan 
to take power from the clans and warlords, and basing authority in territorial-based-courts with a 
defined jurisdictional area. This more cosmopolitan justice was an important step in the formation of a 
functioning state-structure, as the legitimate (and actual) use of violence were being monopolised, 
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according to Weber‘s definition.290 The UIC brought law and order to Mogadishu and Somalia for the 
first time since 1991, as it effectively got rid of warlords and criminal gangs. The US backing for the 
brutal warlords in the ATA gave legitimacy to the Islamic courts, as people were tired of the 
opportunistic and brutal pro-US warlords and just wanted basic security.
291
 People were tired with their 
officially sovereign government, the totally dysfunctional TFG and its institutions, as it provided 
absolutely no (positive sovereignty) services to people. The main reason the UIC was so popular 
among the people
292, was its governance success, or as Ken Menkhaus puts it, its: ―performance 
legitimacy‖293. This UIC popularity meant that local businessmen and ordinary citizens contributed 
money and food to the UIC, which secured local responsibility (and loyalty) of the courts as the 
funding was local.
294
 
 
4.5.2.3 Lack of Unified Leadership, Various Versions of Islam, Mixed Signals 
 The UIC‘s lack of clear hieratical structure and chain of command was however a problem, as both 
moderate and hard-line elements claimed to represent the UIC and made various and sometimes 
extreme statements.
295
 This made its appearance to outsider actors, like the US and Ethiopia, seem 
hostile or at least very confusing. This was a result of the loose and fragile structure of the UIC,
296
 
where different (independent) courts used different kinds of Islam. The majority were traditional 
moderate Sufi Islamic courts, while a few were radical Wahhabi courts.
297
 Some of the more radical 
courts, especially those controlled by the power-full al-Shabaab militias, imposed draconian sharia law 
(in a few areas only) and tried to outlaw chewing of Kat and restricted other traditional Somalia 
customs.
298
 A lack of a unified leadership in the UIC caused considerable inner tension and 
disagreement between the hardliners and the moderates in the UIC leadership.  The UIC were sending 
‗mixed‘ signals about their politics to the outside world, making external actors unsure about the UIC 
policy and intentions. This lead the US, and especially Ethiopia, to believe that the UIC was a 
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dangerous ‗terrorist‘ enemy, believed (wrongly) to be controlled by or cooperating with al-Qaeda.299 
Ethiopia felt threatened as radical elements in the UIC declared a Jihad against (the Christian) Ethiopia, 
and the fact that the UIC had established links to Eritrea (Ethiopia‘s arch enemy). This in the end led to 
Ethiopia‘s invasion of Somalia to crush the UIC.300  
 
4.5.3 The Failure of South-Central Somalia’s first Successful Bottom-up 
State-Structure 
The failure of Somalia‘s first successful bottom-up state-structure, since 1991 was not due to its lack of 
popular legitimacy, but external interests. The UIC had successfully provided positive sovereignty 
services to the population, but it never managed to unite in a strong coherent movement with a clear 
heretical command and leadership. The lack of unified leadership meant the external actors were 
unsure whom they could talk to and who was in charge - an important aspect in communication 
between states. Ethiopia viewed the UIC as a hostile threat, and this concern was backed up by the US 
and IS, who supported the official but totally dysfunctional TFG. As this paper has already asserted, the 
TFG being pro-Ethiopian was (and is) the ‗official‘ government of Somalia, because it suits the 
interests of external powers, and these powers were not willing to accept a de facto state-structure in 
Somalia that could be seen as hostile to its interests, no matter the level of positive governance-services 
it provided for the ordinary Somalians. The 2006 Ethiopian invasion therefore shattered the UIC state 
structure. In a negative sovereignty view, it is important to note that the invasion was officially invited 
by the TFG. The TFG used their negative sovereignty right of entering into relations with other 
sovereign states to ‗ask‘ for Ethiopian assistance to overthrow the UIC.301 
 
 
4.5.6 Ethiopian Invasion (with US Blessing) 
The prospect that (the major part of) Somalia was in the process on being united under an anti-
Ethiopian, officially Islamist leadership, lead to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 
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2006.
302
 Ethiopia is the regional superpower and possesses the region‘s largest and best military forces. 
Ethiopia is also a US ally, enjoying US backing and support.
303
 The UIC forces were therefore quickly 
beaten and the UIC decided to disband and flee south over the border to Kenya, instead (as generally 
expected) to retreat to Mogadishu and fight an urban-guerrilla campaign.
304
 The US Military used the 
opportunity to launch two airstrikes on suspected terrorist of the 1998 US Kenya bombing.
305
 This 
made the US a direct Ethiopian ally and galvanised the Somali anti-Americanism (as well as giving 
jihadist group justification to their Jihad against the Christian crusaders).  Ethiopia immediately 
installed its proxy, the TFG, as rulers in Mogadishu, under heavy Ethiopian military protection. The 
Ethiopian invasion ended the first somewhat effective working state-structure in south and central 
Somalia since 1991. Al-Shabaab and other remnants of UIC conducted a very effective and very dirty 
insurgency war, using guerrilla tactics, terrorists IED and suicide bombings against the Ethiopian 
occupiers and the TFG.
306
 Ethiopian forces replied with equal brutality, shelling whole civilian 
neighbourhoods and other brutal behaviour.
307
  
 
4.5.6.1 After the Fall of the UIC 
The Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia destroyed the UIC, but at the same time strengthened and gave 
legitimacy to the most radical jihadist elements in it, such as the Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab could now 
claim that they had been ‗right‘ about the claim that the ‗infidel Christian‘ crusaders would invade 
Somalia to destroy Islam.
308
 Al-Shabaab embarked on a vicious insurgency campaign, using suicide 
bombings (for the first time in Somalia), IED and other ‗Jihad‘ and al-Qaeda inspired tactics.309 Under 
this pressure from increasing casualties the Ethiopians left Somalia (with their TFG puppet) by the end 
of 2008 to Al-Shabaab and a re-ignited civil war.
310
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The US chose in 2008 to kill the Al-Shabaab leader with a cruise missile attack. This has only furthered 
the Al-Shabaab extremist agenda and determination. Al-Shabaab have recently started using extremely 
harsh and erratic sharia punishment, such as stoning young woman and pulling out gold teeth as they 
considered them un-Islamic!
311
 Interestingly this development changes the conflict from a regional 
Somali one into a kind of proxy war, as both the TFG and Al-Shabaab
312
 are heavily supported from 
external sources. Al-Shabaab is well funded from radical Muslims abroad, and the TFG from the IS 
turning Somalia into a front line (proxy-war) in the GWOT.
313
 In short the IS and especially Ethiopia 
and the US got exactly what they did not want out of interfering directly in Somalia – a radical Islamic 
‗terrorist regime‘, which is actively and proudly joining Al-Qaeda and the global Jihad with attacks 
abroad.
314
 Among them are targets in Denmark
315
 and Australia.
316
 It was almost like a self-fulfilling 
prophecy – the fear of Somalia becoming a breeding ground for international terrorists (a threat to the 
IS) made Somalia just such a threat – due to IS interference. 
 
4.5.7 Why did the UIC Fail? 
This total discrepancy between the wishes of the International Society and wishes of the local 
population is deeply fascinating. The UIC rule was welcomed by almost all ordinary Somalians as it 
brought basic ‗state‘- services such as security and order to large parts of the country, in a bottom-up 
locally based legitimate fashion.  
 
The IS on the other hand is primarily interested not in the welfare and security of ordinary Somalians, 
but to establish a friendly (to them) unitary state with a central government they can make deals with 
(top-down approach), to suit their geo-political (security) interests. The UIC state-structure was 
successful in establishing order in south-central Somalia by creating a monopoly of violence. The 
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reason it was toppled was not its lack of performance or legitimacy among the people it was ruling, but 
due to external geo-political (selfish) interests. Among these interest is Ethiopia‘s interest in a non-
hostile (and preferably weak) Somalian neighbour-state and the US priorities in its GWOT. The IS 
creation of the TFG was in this case representing just that – the interest of external states in Somalia, 
and the IS and Ethiopian interest used the TFG to make their actions officially ‗legitimate‘, in the eyes 
of the IS. 
 
The UIC, like Somaliland, effectively used traditional governance-structure, and incorporated them into 
a functioning state-structure. Its governance was de-centralised based on independent courts, in line 
with traditional Somali governance. Building a state-structure that is compatible with local indigenous 
governance-norms and capabilities. As mentioned earlier, the UIC was mainly comprised of moderate 
courts, and its popularity was mainly attributed to its performance in providing state services (such as 
security) more than due to Somali adherence to political Islam in general and radical Islam in 
particular. The Islamic branding was to a large extent just that - branding. But also effective branding 
in order to provide a workable (uniting) alternative to clannism. This Islamic branding suits the Somali 
culture well as it gives the Somalis a clear uniting identity. This was especially true as the UIC enemy - 
Ethiopia (who was officially acting through its ‗sovereign puppet‘ - the TFG), was Christian. This gave 
a clear identification and justification for creating a ‗Somali‘ state-structure and fight against the 
enemy‘s ‗puppet‘ state-structure – the TFG and its US backed warlords. Somalia‘s disunited 
governance system therefore have proven that it can united if confronted with a common enemy.
73 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The introductory quote to this paper: ―The well is neglected and empty, and there is no one working on 
our behalf‖317 conceptualises the entire Somalian struggle over statehood.  The Somali tribal 
governance culture is not naturally compatible with the centralised state-norms of the IS, and therefore 
these norms do not naturally work to the advantage of the Somalians governance needs.   
 
Somalia is viewed by most (western) outsiders as a failed state where chaos reigns. This is not entirely 
true, and to the extent where it is true - the IS bear a major part of the responsibility for that chaos. 
Somali society is not anarchical having originally been a highly ordered system of traditional clan 
balance and well-functioning social governance. If this de-centralised clan based governance-structure 
was left to function on its own terms and norms it would produce a highly ordered (and reasonably 
safe) society. 
 
The reason that this ordered society is not present in large areas of Somalia today is because of 
interference of western (IS) governance-norms. Every time Somalia had been under a strong central 
government the Somalians have suffered, as the central state was oppressing them. Therefore a strong 
central state is viewed by most Somalians as a negative thing, as it has not historically provided them 
with governance services. The traditional clan based system of governance has historically, even when 
a central state has been present, been the reliable provider of security, representation and welfare. This 
means that these traditional governance-structures are still trusted and relied on by the ordinary 
Somalians. Transferring these traditional governance-structure and loyalties into the new state-structure 
therefore gives this new state-structure great legitimacy. 
 
 The example of Somaliland show that the traditional governance and conflict handling mechanisms, 
can resolve conflicts and be the foundation for a fully functioning ‗new‘ de facto state.  The quote 
emphasis ‗no one working on our behalf‘ is very true in the case of Somaliland. Somaliland had no 
support to construct their state-structure. This turned out to be an advantage, as this ensures that the 
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local governance-structures and the clan elders that were actually representing and governing the 
population, could be transferred into the new state-structure on its own terms. Had the IS had its full 
focus on Somaliland in this period, it is doubtful that such an ‗illiberal‘ state-structure would have 
survived international pressure and interference due to the lack of understanding of such a governance-
structure in the west. 
 
The IS interference is what is creating the chaos in Somalia. The massive self-interests of foreign 
actors, such as the US and Ethiopia in Somalia, have a negative impact on Somalia. The IS interest in a 
state-structure for Somalia is to handle the fears of the IS - its job is therefore primarily to prevent 
terrorism and piracy operating out of Somalia. The TFG has been established by the IS to perform this 
territorial ‗accountability‘ job towards the IS. 
 
 The IS state-structure initiative for Somalia (the TFG) have however not produced anything good for 
the ordinary citizen of Somalia. The TFG solely represent the interest and actors of the IS, and 
cooperates with and exercises influence through the powerful but predatory warlords and (some) clans 
in Somalia, who is only participating in the TFG to secure personal gain and resources for themselves. 
Therefore, the TFG is not representing or providing effective government services to the ordinary 
Somalian. Somalians feel that the legitimacy of the TFG is extremely low, in part due to the fact that 
Somalians feel TFG have often effectively acted as an Ethiopian puppet regime and promoted 
Ethiopia‘s interest in Somalia more than the interests of Somalians.  
 
This is well in line with the opening quote: ‗that the Somalians can expect nothing good from external 
actors´, but have to rely on their own capabilities to survive. The Somalians have shown their initiative 
and will to survive very clearly. When the US decided to buy the ATA-warlords, as they were 
frustrated that the TFG was not doing enough to combat ‗Islamic terrorists‘ operating in Somalia, the 
local Somalians acted to promote their own security interests. They united their existing locally based 
and de-centralised Islamic Courts into a Union (the UIC) and threw the warlords and TFG out! After 
that the UIC successfully established a monopoly of violence, and formed a very successful domestic 
and popular legitimate state-structure. The Somalians initiative to improve their own situation by 
creating the UIC could however not be accepted by the IS, especially the US and Ethiopia, who saw 
UIC as a ‗terrorist‘ organisation. This led to the Ethiopian invasion and the overthrow of the UIC. 
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The interest in state-structures for Somalia to the (actors in the) IS are therefore first and foremost that 
it serves the interest of the IS. Therefore it needs to be friendly to them (the US and Ethiopia) and be 
responsible for its territory towards the other states in the IS. The TFG have official sovereignty over, 
and is therefore officially responsible for Somalia‘s territory, but the TFG is also a failed state (quasi 
state), because it does not practically govern that territory and is not legitimate in the eyes of the 
Somalians. 
 
The conclusion to this paper is that any successful state-structure in Somalia has to be constructed 
bottom-up, and in accordance and corporation with the traditional Somali governance-structures and 
norms. This is the only way the Somalis will believe that it is representing their interests. This 
suspicion towards IS-norms and central states is due to the Somalians previous bad experiences with 
top-down controlled central-states and actors serving outside interests and actors. IS-norms of state-
construction therefore cannot be used in the construction stage of a bottom-up state-structure, as they 
have no legitimacy. After the state-structure is successfully formed, as the example of Somaliland has 
shown us, it can however successfully be transformed into a democratic and economically liberal de 
facto state (just as the IS likes it) to the benefit of both its citizens and the stability of the IS. The best 
thing the IS could therefore do is to allow these locally based bottom-up state-structures to emerge by 
their own initiative.  Allow them to gradually transform themselves into states-structures that live up to 
the IS-norms and can be beneficial to the IS like Somaliland is. The IS and especially UN need 
however to change its stance against de facto states in order to do this, and also need to recognise them 
as sovereign states – as state-structures like Somaliland have proved their right to live through positive 
sovereignty. It makes no sense that the IS continues to insist on reviving an (illusional) central 
government/state of Somalia. 
 
Local legitimacy and initiative is however not enough to guarantee the success of a popular bottom-up 
state. As the Example of UIC has shown, a state-structure that is perceived (rightly or wrongly) as a 
threat to powerful actors in the IS (such as Ethiopia or the US) are not allowed to live. The security 
interest of these powerful states-actors of the IS overrules the local right to security (the security the 
UIC was providing them) and the UIC was militarily destroyed. This is despite the fact that the UIC 
was very successful and popular among the Somalians because it effectively provided them security, 
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representation and welfare. A further point is that toppling the UIC state-structure did not benefit the IS 
agenda at all. The radical jihadist groups like al-Shabaab have gained in strength thanks to the 
(Christian) Ethiopian invasion, as they can now justify their ‗jihad‘ by referring to the ‗Christian 
Crusaders‘ invasion. The IS would therefore properly have been better off if it had tried to cooperate 
with the UIC and appealing to its moderate fraction.  
 
Summed up, the requirements for a successful state-structure in Somalia are that it is locally 
constructed through traditional governance-structures and capabilities. It furthermore has to be 
perceived as non-hostile to the IS. Thirdly, a rising bottom-up state-structure will benefit from as little 
outside attention as possible, as the IS official norms for state-construction is not compatible with the 
Somali norms. If a state-structure can rise quietly on its own with little attention or outside ‗support‘ 
this is the best way, as any outside involvement will endanger the progress already made. Somalians 
are therefore best served if allowed to work out their own problems. This goes well in line with the 
Somali proverb that this paper started with: 
 
  ―The well is neglected and empty, and there is no one working on our behalf‖318 
 
 
                                                 
318
 Ibid.  
77 
 
6. Bibliography 
 
Ahmed, I. I. ―The heritage of war and state collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: local-level effects, 
external interventions and reconstruction.‖ Third World Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1999): 113–127. 
Battera, F. ―Some Considerations on State Building in Divided Societies and the Role of the" 
International Community": Somaliland and Somalia Compared.‖ Northeast African Studies 10, 
no. 3 (2009): 225–247. 
Bilgin, P., and A. D Morton. ―From ‗Rogue‘to ‗Failed‘States? The Fallacy of Short-termism*.‖ Politics 
24, no. 3 (2004): 169–180. 
Bradbury, M., and M. Kleinman. Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between Aid 
and Security in Kenya. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2010. 
Bradbury, Mark. Becoming Somaliland. Indiana University Press, 2008. 
Bronwyn Bruton. ―In the Quicksands of Somalia.‖ Foreign Affairs November/December (2009): p.79-
94. 
Bryden, M., and J. Brickhill. ―Disarming Somalia: lessons in stabilisation from a collapsed state.‖ 
Conflict, Security & Development 10, no. 2 (2010): 239–262. 
Clunan, A. L, H. A Trinkunas, and T. Harold. Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an 
Era of Softened Sovereignty. Stanford Security Studies, 2010. 
Hameiri, S. ―Capacity and its fallacies: international state building as state transformation.‖ 
Millennium-Journal of International Studies 38, no. 1 (2009): 55. 
———. ―Failed states or a failed paradigm? State capacity and the limits of institutionalism.‖ Journal 
of International Relations and Development 10, no. 2 (2007): 122–149. 
Hameiri, Shahar. Regulating Statehood: State Building and the Transformation of the Global Order. 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Hoehne, M. V. ―Mimesis and Mimicry in Dynamics of State and Identity Formation in Northern 
Somalia.‖ Africa 79, no. 2 (2009): 252–281. 
Höhne, M. V. ―Political identity, emerging state structures and conflict in northern Somalia.‖ The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 44, no. 03 (2006): 397–414. 
Jackson, R. H. Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations, and the Third World. Cambridge 
78 
 
University Press, 1993. 
James, Alan. Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society. Unwin Hyman, 1986. 
Kaplan, S. Fixing fragile states: a new paradigm for development. Greenwood Publishing Group, 
2008. 
Kaplan, S. ―The remarkable story of Somaliland.‖ Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3 (2008): 143–157. 
Koskenmaki, R. ―Legal implications resulting from state failure in light of the case of Somalia.‖ Nordic 
Journal of International Law 73, no. 1 (2004): 1–36. 
Lewis, I. M, and J. A. Mayall. ―A Study of Decentralised Political Structure for Somalia. A Menu of 
Options.‖ London: The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1995. 
Lewis, I. M. Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society. Society. Hurst & 
Company, London, 2008. 
Lyons, T., and A. I Samatar. Somalia: state collapse, multilateral intervention, and strategies for 
political reconstruction. Brookings Institution Press, 1995. 
Marchal, R. ―Warlordism and terrorism: how to obscure an already confusing crisis? The case of 
Somalia.‖ International Affairs 83, no. 6 (2007): 1091–1106. 
Marten, K. ―Warlordism in comparative perspective.‖ International Security 31, no. 3 (2007): 41–73. 
McGregor, A. ―Warlords or Counter-Terrorists: US Intervention in Somalia.‖ Terrorism Focus 3 
(2006): 21. 
Menkhaus, K. ―Governance without government in Somalia: Spoilers, state building, and the politics of 
coping.‖ International Security 31, no. 3 (2007): 74–106. 
———. ―Local Security Systems in Somali East Africa.‖ Fragile States and Insecure People: 
Violence, Security and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century: Palgrave Macmillan (2007): 67–
98. 
———. ―The crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in five acts.‖ African Affairs 106, no. 424 (2007): 357. 
Møller, B. ―The Somali Conflict: The role of external actors.‖ Danish Institute for International Studies 
2009, no. 3 (2009). 
Møller, Bjørn. ―Somalia: From Stateless Order to Talibanisation?.‖ Real Instituto Elcano. Análisis 42, 
no. 2009 (2009): 13. 
Paris, R. ―Bringing the Leviathan back in: Classical versus contemporary studies of the liberal peace.‖ 
International Studies Review 8, no. 3 (2006): 425. 
———. ―Peacekeeping and the constraints of global culture.‖ European Journal of International 
79 
 
Relations 9, no. 3 (2003): 441. 
Pegg, S. De Facto States in the International System. Institute of International Relations, University of 
British Columbia, 1998. 
———. ―De Facto States in the International System.‖ Institute of International Relations, University 
of British Columbia, no. Working paper No. 21 (1998). 
Richmond, O. P. ―UN peace operations and the dilemmas of the peacebuilding consensus.‖ 
International Peacekeeping 11, no. 1 (2004): 83–101. 
―The failed states index.‖ Foreign Policy 149 (2005): 56–65. 
Yamane, T. ―State failure and Armed Group: An Implication for Peacebuilding.‖ Hiroshima Peace 
Science,  Hiroshima University 31 (2009): 109–133. 
  
 
